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INTRODUCTION

Despite Dr. Kevorkian's crusade to achieve judicial recognition of the right to die, America's legal and ethical struggle with
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide ("P.A.S.")' shows little
2
sign of resolution. In the joint cases of Washington v. Glucksberg
and Vacco v. Quill,3 the Supreme Court held that New York and
Washington statutes banning P.A.S. did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4. While there is thus
no constitutional right to die or to P.A.S., the Court explicitly left
the door open for states to legalize the practice if they felt so dis5
posed.
However, perhaps in keeping within its institutional role apart
from the legislature, the Court did not attempt to enter into a serious discussion of the substantive provisions that P.A.S. regulation
in America might or should contain. The subject of P.A.S. regulation will almost certainly continue to be a heated issue of legislative and public debate in the coming years, as no personal decision
has potentially greater individual and collective consequences than
I The definitions of these terms are occasionally in dispute, but I will use "physicianassisted suicide" ("P.A.S.") to encompass the situation where the physician provides the
life-ending means to her patient, but where the patient administers those drugs herself.
"Euthanasia" also entails the active termination of a person's life, but requires a doctor
or other person to administer the life-ending drug to and for the patient, rather than the
patient herself. The "right to die" encompasses both of these terms-more than merely a
right to refuse treatment, it means the right to the active termination of one's life. This
paper will focus primarily on addressing the P.A.S. debate and how we should formulate
responsible regulation and legislation to govern its practice in America.
2 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
3 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
4 Seven years prior to this decision, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional
right to die, but rather simply a "liberty interest" in refusing treatment. The Court in
Quill was quite aware that allowing the practice of P.A.S. goes substantially beyond "refusing treatment." 521 U.S. at 796-809.
5 The majority in Glucksberg concluded its opinion by declaring, "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality,
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society." 521 U.S. at 735. A few months later,
Oregon voters again passed the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 127.800-97 (1998), amended by 1999 Or. Laws Ch. 423, reaffirming their support for
an explicitly legalized P.A.S. regime.
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the decision to take one's own life. We must keep in mind that the
issue does not merely boil down to a patient's autonomy and liberty to end his suffering versus the state's interest in the preservation and sanctity of human life. Numerous other ethical considerations are implicated, including the notion of dignity and control,
the distinction between actions and omissions, and whether medical professionals are at society's command or retain their individual values. 6 Moreover, the spectacular rise of managed care introduces a host of additional dilemmas, many of which jump out at
any reasonable policy-maker, given the method in which Health
Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") structure financial incentives and control the distribution of information. 7 HMOs know all
too well that elderly and terminally ill patients run up huge medical bills in their last months of life8 (40 percent of Medicare expenditures are made in the last year of life), and it is not unimaginable that P.A.S.-in the absence of regulation-will be introduced
as one very haunting method to control these skyrocketing costs. 9
In light of these serious concerns, we must develop sound
guidelines to prepare the health care industry and its patients to
function in the presence of a P.A.S. environment that is susceptible to grave abuses if not responsibly legislated and regulated. We
need policies in place that limit and control the actions of renegade
6

See generally Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Sur-

rounding Physician-Assisted Suicide (Linda L. Emanuel ed., 1998) (presenting a complete discussion of the ethical considerations surrounding P.A.S.).
See John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System-Managed Care, 327 New
Eng. J. Med. 742-47 (1992); National Center for Health Statistics, Health Maintenance
Organizations and Enrollment: Selected Years, 1976-97 (visited Oct. 12, 1999)
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchswww/fastats/hinsure.htm> [hereinafter NCHS, Health Maintenance Organizations and Enrollment] (noting that HMOs have increased in market
share from approximately 4 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent in 1994).
8 Lecture given by Mark Zitter at U.C. Berkeley, March 15, 1993. Zitter, President of
the Center for Health Outcomes and Information in San Francisco, opined that our nation's health care cost crisis could be solved if we were to offer every American
$100,000 today in return for their agreement to die 30 days earlier than they otherwise
would (and hence, they would spare society the prohibitive cost of their end-of-life
treatment).
9 Medicare expenditures, 40 percent of which on average come in one's last year of
life, continue to grow dramatically with the increasing life expectancies of the elderly.
See National Center for Health Care Statistics, Health and Aging Chartbook from
Health, United States, 1999 (visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchswww/products/pubs/pubd/hus/99huschtdes.htm> (noting that enrollment of Medicare patients
in managed care plans has increased to 12 percent in 1997).
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Kevorkians in order to protect the sanctity of the decision to undertake P.A.S. In judging potential policies, we must focus on
whether their guidelines ensure that patients are competent and
fully informed, and that their decisions are voluntary and enduring.
Given this backdrop, this paper is broken down into four parts.
The first segment tracks the history and development of the right
to die in America, beginning with "Do-Not-Resuscitate" orders,
extending to the right to refuse medical treatment, and then to the
right to refuse even food and water.10 The legal development to
date brings us to a position in America where both a constitutional
right to die or to P.A.S. have been explicitly rejected, but one
where it is also perfectly possible for states to legislate P.A.S. into
existence.
Part II addresses the individual and collective ethical implications surrounding the P.A.S. debate in the United States. Individual considerations in support of allowing the practice include: (1)
the notion of mercy, (2) the idea that some killing is justified if it
is to relieve unbearable suffering, (3) that dignity lies in control of
one's own fate, and (4) that respect for patient autonomy and selfdetermination should be the highest priority of the medical profession. Militating against these considerations are deontological arguments against the taking of any human life, provocative evidence that calls into question whether true autonomy can ever
exist, and the distinction the Supreme Court drew between an act
to affirmatively terminate one's life and the decision to simply
omit treatment.11
Part III considers the additional dangers presented by the rise
of the managed care health care environment in which we now
live. Managed care organizations have enjoyed a meteoric growth
in enrollment in the past decade, 12 and this increase in reach, cou10 Some of the case law that will be discussed and analyzed on these topics includes:
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997);
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri. Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
11

See Quill, 521 U.S. at 796-809.

12 See NCHS, Health Maintenance Organizations and Enrollment, supra note 7 (noting
that HMO market share is up from 4 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent in 1994).
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pled with the incentives HMOs implement to control costs and information, represents a serious danger with respect to legalizing
P.A.S. in America. The financial inducements these plans offer to
limit care and the gag clauses they install to control the flow of information to patients are patently conducive to abuse of P.A.S.
Worse, they threaten to irreparably undermine the viability and
trusting nature of the traditional doctor-patient relationship. Charles Dougherty warns that patients will reasonably begin to question, "Is my doctor's advice that there is nothing left for me but
euthanasia motivated by my best interest or by his, by concern for
my suffering or for her delivery network?" 13 That is not the way to
run America's healthcare system-confidences will break down
and give way to fear and distrust of the medical profession. 14 Responsible policy and legislation must be passed in America in order to install safeguards that minimize the harrowing conflicts that
the practice of P.A.S. in the new managed care era presents.
Finally, given the above issues of concern, Part IV explores
attempts by states and countries to regulate P.A.S. to ensure that
physicians do not irresponsibly engage in the practice. I analyze
the instructive guidelines of the Netherlands and the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act, the latter being our nation's first and most famous example of P.A.S. legislation. I then consider what I believe
to be the most sound policy put forth to date, the Model State Act
to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide. 15 Put together by a team of lawyers, academics, and physicians in Massachusetts, it institutes strict patient and procedural safeguards to
help ensure active, informed, voluntary, and competent decisionmaking by patients. Further, it provides a measure of legal certainty to well-meaning physicians who fear potential liability in
the absence of state legislation on the issue. With a few modifications, and ideally uniform implementation, this is the direction I
urge that P.A.S. policy takes to minimize the threat of abuse and to
secure long-term public confidence and support.

13

Charles J. Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness, and Euthanasia, 9 Is-

sues L. & Med. 151, 164 (1993).

14 See id. at 164.
15 See Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1996).
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I should emphasize here however that the intent of this paper is
not to convince or dissuade the reader of the merits of P.A.S. generally. 16 Rather, in light of the reality and potential availability of
P.A.S. in the years to come, I urge that we must be exceptionally
careful and diligent in creating regulations that maximize the goals
that the practice of P.A.S. was intended to achieve, while doing as
much as possible to alleviate its morally disturbing potential for
abuse. Especially in the relatively new healthcare context of managed care, we must consider how to formulate an organized and
disciplined P.A.S. policy in the United States.
I. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO
AMERICA

DIE IN

Before the ethical and legal implications of P.A.S. can be discussed, we must consider the history of the development of the
right to die in America.
A. Resuscitation and DNR Orders
The issue of resuscitation of heart function and accompanying
"Do Not Resuscitate" ("DNR") orders are an important part of the
debate that arose far before the question of a constitutional right to
die was ever contemplated. For hundreds of years, physicians have
experimented with resuscitation techniques. 17 One of modem
medicine's most dramatic achievements is its ability to rescue
people from the brink of death by restoring their heartbeat and
breathing. However, along with this accomplishment came the
disturbing reality that many patients were being "saved" only to
16

Rather, I seek to present the considerations on both sides of the debate in Parts II

and III, although on balance I believe that the benefits of a well-formulated P.A.S. policy
outweigh the admittedly serious risks.
17 See President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A
Report on the Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 232 (1983)
[hereinafter President's Commission] (discussing the early history of resuscitation techniques by Vesalius, who first described ventricular fibrillation and its relationship to interrupted breathing, and attempted intubation and artificial respiration with a reed inserted into the trachea. In addition, during the 17th century, William Harvey was credited
with the first direct manipulation of a heart (a pigeon's) as a resuscitation technique, and
in 18th century Britain, John Hunter was successful in restoring the breathing of a dog by
inserting the nozzle of a bellows into its trachea.).

48

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:1

live in permanent vegetative or otherwise seriously disabled states
that they would not have voluntarily chosen to endure.
Hospitals and medical associations were at first slow to respond, but more recently a fair number have attempted to establish
written standards for DNR (sometimes called "No Code") orders. 18 The 1974 version of the "Standards for Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC)" of the
American Heart Association and the National Academy of Sciences declared, "Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is not indicated in
certain situations, such as in cases of terminal irreversible illness
where death is not unexpected...." 19 Pioneering policies of DNR
orders were published by several hospitals in 1976, reflecting professional associations' recognition that non-resuscitation was appropriate when the well-being of a patient would not be served by
an attempt to reverse cardiac arrest.
Nevertheless, there remained unresolved issues-still disputed
today-of the utmost consequence: Who should have the authority
to write the guidelines (doctors, hospitals, or professional associations)? How do they decide when to resuscitate versus when not
to? And who should be consulted in the decision (the patient, the
patient's family, or no one)? DNR orders began as oral directives
promulgated by individual doctors, but it became the general
practice for hospitals to create guidelines for their use. However,
since hospitals have no licenses to practice medicine, committees
composed of doctors became the authors. The further question of
how to decide when versus when not to resuscitate pitted the patient's autonomy and self-determination (viewed from a deontological perspective) against her well-being (a paternalistic determination made by the physician) and the utilitarian notion of
equity (i.e., what is the best use of limited medical resources?).
The courts have found a presumption in favor of resuscitation,
which is not surprising given that the effects of its omission are ir18 See id. at 236 n.23. ("The prevalence of written policies nationwide is not known"
and, while the President's Commission found that many hospitals are now drafting these
standards, "it is not uncommon, [particularly] for community hospitals, not to have a
written policy.").
19 National Conference on Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and
Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC), 227 JAMA 837, 864 (1974).
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reversible. 20 Today, though, a competent patient's preferences for
or against resuscitation will be honored over her physician's assessment of the "value" of CPR.2 1At last count, twenty states had
statutes of varying complexity that afforded room for a competent
patient's consent to DNR (while imposing
far greater restrictions
22
on the ability of a surrogate to consent).
B. Right of Incompetent Patientsto Refuse Treatment--Quinlan
While competency alleviates many of the difficult decisions
implicated in DNR orders, there remains the issue of the incompetent patient whose family or guardian wants to terminate treatment. In 1976, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed this
question in In re Quinlan.23 Karen Quinlan had ceased breathing
for two fifteen minute periods in April of 1975, and was left comatose with decortication in a "chronic persistent vegetative
state," requiring a respirator for survival. 24 Her father sought to be
appointed guardian in order to authorize the discontinuance of all
"extraordinary medical procedures" sustaining her life, since these
measures presented no hope for her eventual recovery. In rendering its decision in favor of Quinlan, the court balanced the patient's right to privacy (noting that Karen could, if lucid, refuse the
respirator) versus the interests of the state in the preservation and
sanctity of human life, and the doctor's right to treat according to
her best medical judgment. The Quinlan court's balancing test
held that both of the state interests diminish and the right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the patient's prognosis dims. 25 The state had no compelling interest in
forcing Karen to vegetate-in effect, life is not sacred separate
20

See President's Commission, supra note 17, at 239-40.

21

But cf. In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (finding that

the decision not to resuscitate an Alzheimer's patient was "peculiarly within the competence of the medical profession"). Note, however, that this represents the early days of

Srisprudence on the subject and that patient autonomy has become the trump card today.
New York's DNR statute, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2965 (McKinney 1993), for example, allows a proxy to give consent to DNR only if the patient is terminally ill, the patient is terminally unconscious, or CPR would be futile or would place an extraordinary
burden on the patient.
23
24

355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
See id. at 653-55.

25

See id. at 664.
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from the condition in which one is living it. Furthermore, the court
ruled that the right of privacy survives incompetency so that it can
be exercised by a guardian, 26 and lost in the shuffle was the holding that a doctor's right to treat according to her best medical
judgment was now almost totally gone under the weight of patient
autonomy. In the court's defense, it should be noted that it felt it
was actually helping physicians by removing their worries about
the legal ramifications that might result from withdrawing treatment. The point of the court was that when it is a hopeless case,
doctors should not be locked into traditional "medical ethics" that
call for continued futile medical intervention.
C. An Incompetent's Right to Refuse Treatment when There is No
Family to Decide-Saikewicz
One year after Quinlan, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took on the problem that many incompetent elderly patients face, namely, the lack of a family member to guide the endof-life treatment decision. 2 7 In Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,28 a 67 year-old man with the mental age of a two-yearold was diagnosed with leukemia, but was given a 30 to 50 percent
chance of remission with aggressive treatment. 2 9 The court began
its discussion by noting that the doctrine of informed consent and
the constitutional right to privacy 30 protect the right of a patient to
refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances; and in the
31
case of an incompetent, the right may be asserted by a guardian.
Here, without a family guardian available, the court used a "substituted judgment" standard (i.e., what would Saikewicz want if he
could express his wishes?) in holding not to treat him. The court
reasoned that he would not understand why he was being subjected to treatment, and that the court's decision would therefore
respect his autonomy (i.e., a balancing test where autonomy is the
ultimate trump card). The emphasis on "substituted judgment" was
26

See id.

27

See Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).

28
29
30

370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
See id.
See'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the right to

rivacy is guaranteed by the Constitution).
See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423-24.

I
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ostensibly intended to get courts out of the business of making
value decisions on the worth of one's life. However, Dr. Alan
Stone questions whether there was not an implicit quality of life
calculus operating under the surface, and worse, the prospect that
this decision evidenced discrimination against the mentally retarded. 32 Saikewicz has also been criticized for implying that
whenever a patient is unconscious or incompetent and we are not
sure whether treatment would help, we must look to a court to find
out what to do. This would amount to an incredible and impractical intrusion on decision-making in medicine, and the great inconvenience and expense to the patient's family might discourage
them from making the right decision in the first place (i.e., to
avoid the pain and humiliation of a judicial hearing). In essence,
the problem is that conflicts of interest in medical decision-making
are quite common; hence, shouldn't they be33quite severe before a
court routinely makes the ultimate decision?
D. Craftinga Right Beyond the Right to Refuse TreatmentConroy
The case of In re Conroy34 carried far greater consequences

than that of Quinlan,for it extended the right to refuse treatment to
a setting far more prevalent than that of Karen Quinlan's. Claire
Conroy was not subject to life in a vegetative coma; rather, she
was an 80 year-old woman in a nursing home suffering various
ailments in addition to Alzheimer's disease.35 The issue presented
was whether she had a right to withdraw her feeding tube-i.e.,
was the feeding tube considered a "medical treatment" such that
one would have the right to refuse it? Intuitively, rejection of food
and water seems qualitatively different than refusal of a respirator
or other high-tech means of treatment. Perhaps if a person cannot
swallow by herself and she refuses the feeding tube, this act would
32

Lecture given by Dr. Stone at Harvard Law School, October 20, 1997.

33

But cf. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980). The Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts ruled that Saikewicz was a unique case because he was a ward of the state.
See id. at 120. The Spring Court said that there is no need to go to court to see if treatment should be given to an incompetent if his family, doctors, and ethics committee are
all consulted and agree on the resolution of the issue. See id. at 120-22.
34

486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).

35

Seeid. at 1218.

52

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:1

be more akin to refusal of treatment. However, if she can swallow
but refuses to do so, this now seems more like suicide, and there is
a long tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence against such a
right. 36 Perhaps a better distinction to make would be between extraordinary and ordinary treatment, but the court rejected this notion. So then, one might ask: is suicide something we always want
37
to prevent?
The issue facing the Conroy court, though, was not simply
what to do when a patient refuses food and water, but whether a
feeding tube can be removed once it has been inserted. The court
discussed three tests for making the determination. 38 First, when
the patient has previously expressed her intent regarding the situation, the individual's subjective choice should be honored. 39 Note,
this has nothing to do with the reasonable person; even if the patient's choice is idiosyncratic, the court respects it in the name of
autonomy. Evidence of this subjective intent can be found in a
living will, advanced directive, durable power of attorney, religious beliefs, or a prior pattern of life conduct.40 The court will consider the remoteness, consistency, thoughtfulness, and specificity
of the prior statement of intent, but also medical evidence, especially pain. On the other hand, if there is not enough evidence to
make this substituted judgment, the court invokes the parens patriae powers of the state to choose in favor of an incompetent's
best interests. 41 In this second scenario, where there is some evidence of the patient's wish to refuse treatment, the court engages
in a limited objective test, requiring that the burden of continuing
treatment clearly outweighs the benefit in order for cessation of
treatment to be ordered. 42 However, in the third situation where
there is no evidence at all of the patient's intent, the court employs
36 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
37 The Saikewicz court did in fact make the distinction between rational and irrational
suicide. See Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 & n.11
(Mass. 1977). Justice David Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg noted that many states
have decriminalized suicide. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 773-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
38 See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229-33.
39

40
41
42

See id. at 1229-31.

See id. at 1229-30.
Seeid. at 1231.
See id. at 1232.
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a purely objective test that yields a strong presumption for preserving life. In order for treatment to be stopped, the burden prethe benefit, or the
sented by the treatment must markedly outweigh
43
"inhumane."
considered
be
must
treatment
Conroy is significant in that it explicitly rejected all of the traditional criteria for life and death decision-making, in effect holding that the patient can refuse any treatment if her intent is expressed. The court dismissed the medical distinctions of
withholding versus withdrawing treatment, actions versus omissions, 44 ordinary versus extraordinary treatment, and medical
treatment versus feeding (i.e., receiving food and water). The court
then imposed virtually impossible procedures for implementing its
decision. 45 It noted the many reasons to be cautious regarding the
vulnerable population of nursing home residents, who often have
no family, do not know their doctors, and frequently receive poor
care from the nursing home because it rarely makes acute care
medical decisions. 46 While Claire Conroy herself was held not to
meet any of the three tests the court formulated, the case stands as
an important step in crafting a right beyond that of simply refusing
treatment.

43

Id. An "inhumane" treatment is one that causes recurring, unavoidable, and severe

4 See id. at 1234-36. The Conroy court explicitly rejected the distinction between allowing a person to die of a disease by omitting treatment in the first place, versus hastening death by discontinuing treatment. See id. at 1234.
45 See id. at 1241-42. Conroy implemented substantial procedural safeguards for the
determination of patient competency and for the ultimate treatment decision. See id. at
1241. The court called for a judicial determination of incompetency by clear and convincing evidence of whether the patient had the ability to understand, evaluate her options, or communicate a decision (there must be no chance of regaining competence).
See id. at 1241. If the patient was "unfit to manage her affairs," she received a general
guardian. The procedures for the ultimate refusal-of-treatment decision required the
guardian, family member, doctor, or nursing home to notify an ombudsman, who investigated the situation. See id. at 1241. Medical evidence is then taken from the nursing
home and two other unaffiliated physicians, and the guardian and ombudsman must concur to order the cessation of treatment. See id. at 1242.
46

See id. at 1240.
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E. Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Die ?-Cruzan
The Supreme Court took on the question of "Is there a right to
47
die?" in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.
Nancy Cruzan was involved in a single car accident, as a result of
which she suffered anoxia of the brain and severe brain damage. 48
She fell into a persistent (and then permanent) vegetative state and
required a feeding tube to meet her daily essential needs. 49 Her
parents requested termination of the stomach tube when doctors
concluded there was no chance of Cruzan's return to sapient function, but the hospital would not do so without trial court approval. 50 This permission was granted in light of evidence of a
prior conversation Cruzan had with a friend (that she would not
want to continue her life unless she could live "halfway normally"). 5 ' The trial court held that there is a fundamental right to
end death-prolonging 52procedures based on the Missouri state and
federal Constitutions.
However, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the
common law and constitutional rights of privacy that other state
courts had upheld, in essence adopting a formulation similar to
that in Saikewicz. 53 The court held that the state interest in preserving the sanctity of life was great, and that Cruzan's parents did
not have the right to decide the question. 54 The court emphasized
the state's parenspatriae duty to its citizens, and the fact that state
law determines what power guardians have. 55 Thus, the Missouri
Supreme Court required a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Cruzan would have wanted the removal of her feeding
tube. 56

47

48

497 U.S. 261 (1990).

See id. at 266.
See id.
50 See id. at 267-68.
51 Seeid. at 268.
52 See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (outlining the
trial court's reasoning of the constitutional right to end death-prolonging treatment).
53 See id. at 410-20.
54 See id. at 424-27.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 425.
49
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55

On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist declared that "the question is simply and starkly
whether the United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from
choosing the rule of decision that it did" (i.e., from implementing
procedures that require the family to come to court to present clear
and convincing evidence). 57 Once the issue was framed this narrowly, it became far more difficult to argue with the Court's
holding. Cruzan would need a fundamental right to privacy that
the state could not impinge upon without a compelling interest and
narrowly tailored remedy. However, the Supreme Court degraded
the right to privacy to a "mere" liberty interest (following the logic
of Solicitor General Kenneth Starr in Bowers v. Hardwick58)-i.e.,
the liberty interest contained in the 14th Amendment was not a
general right of privacy. 59 While "liberty" meant at least the freedom from state-imposed physical restraints, it was not an unqualified right and did not automatically extend to an incompetent person. The Rehnquist majority further held that the state's interest in
preserving life was great and not diminished by quality of life
judgments. 60 Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that Missouri's procedures were rationally designed to serve legitimate state interests,
for it is reasonable to place the burden on those who wish to make
an irreversible decision. 61 The state was justified in seeking to
protect the interest of the individual, as parents do not necessarily
62
know what their adult children would want.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the decision, emphasizing
"that the point at which life becomes 'worthless' . . . [is not] set

forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this
Court. '63 Thus, as the Constitution is silent with respect to quality
of life considerations, it is not the business of the Court to interfere
by making such a determination. Strikingly, Laurence Tribe's
1988 treatise, "Rights of Privacy and Personhood" contains much
the same attitude that Justice Scalia expressed, as Tribe contended
57
58
59
60

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279, n.7.
See id. at 282.

61
62

Seeid. at 283.
See id. at 286.

63

Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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that courts were using medical criteria and quality of life decisions
under the surface to circumscribe the right to self-determination. 64
However, Tribe opined further that a constitutional right to die
might be uncontainable and susceptible to grave abuses and thus
more troubling to courts than manipulating or extending the right
65
of self-determination.
Justice William Brennan dissented in Cruzan, arguing in favor
of a fundamental right to privacy over a mere liberty interest. 66 He
believed that the state's only interest should be in accuracy, a con67
cept which does not include the state's general interest in life.
Furthermore, he raises an interesting philosophic point in that either decision (to remove the feeding tube or not) is irrevocable
from the patient's perspective--Cruzan will live on "irrevocably"
in her permanent vegetative state if it is not withdrawn. 68 While I
am not completely convinced of this argument, it is evident that
Justice Brennan, more than any of the other Justices, put himself
directly into Cruzan's situation, emphasizing that "an ignoble end,
steeped in decay, is abhorrent. ' 69 It is not unlikely that he (and
many of us when we think about these life and death issues) was
asking, "Is this the way I want to die?"
Nevertheless, the Cruzan decision has merit. While the lack of
a constitutional right to die may create some situations that seem
merciless and require lengthy procedures to be remedied, I would
be far more concerned if the Supreme Court haphazardly gave incompetent patients a constitutional right to die without any checks
and balances. If that were to have been the Court's holding, I do
believe Tribe's admonition about the potential for grave abuses
would be quite real indeed.

64 See Laurence Tribe, Rights of Privacy and Personhood, American Constitutional
Law, 2d ed., 1364-71 (Foundation Press 1988).

65

See id. at 1370.

66

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

67

See id. at 315-16. Justice Brennan felt that the "clear and convincing evidence"

standard served only to load the state's interest unfairly and inaccurately. See id. at 31621.

68

See id. at 320.

69

Id.at3lO.
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F. The Last Word to Date on the Constitutionalityof the Right to
Die-A Look at New York and Washington's Statutes Banning
Assisted Suicide-Quill and Glucksberg
The Supreme Court directly examined the issue of P.A.S. in
the joint cases of Vacco v. Quill70 and Washington v. Glucksberg.71 In both New York and Washington state, statutes were
passed that made it a crime for a physician or other person to assist
another person in an attempt to commit suicide. 72 Doctors in both
states challenged the law as unconstitutional, alleging it violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits agreed. 73 The Second Circuit struck down New York's ban on P.A.S., holding it violated
Equal Protection to allow those on life-support systems to direct
their removal, while "those who are similarly situated, except for
the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not al74
lowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the patient does have a
liberty interest based on the Due Process Clause. 75 The decision
then with respect to hastening death comes down to a balancing
test between a patient's liberty versus the state's interest in the
preservation and sanctity of life, with the outcome shifting in favor
of the patient's interest as her quality of life deteriorates. The
Ninth Circuit held that this liberty interest was not based only on
historical tradition, but also on changing circumstances-with the
76
Supreme Court's decisions regarding abortion in Roe v. Wade
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,77 indicating forward-thinking,
70 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
71 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
72 Washington law provides "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when
he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9A.36.060(1) (1994). New York law states "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he intentionally.., aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. Penal
Law § 120.30 (McKinney, 1993).
73 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
74

Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.

75

See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 815-17.

76
77

410U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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78
progressive decision-making not bound by past interpretations.
The court methodically refuted the state's interests in preserving
life and preventing suicide, reasoning (1) that it had passed a law
allowing the terminally ill to refuse treatment; and (2) that the
state's interest is diminished if the patient cannot be cured. 79 The
court went on to address the trauma on the family imposed by
watching a loved one deteriorate, and emphasized that voluntariness and procedural safeguards could combat the slippery slope
80
problem.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court
decisions. In Glucksberg, the Court focused on the long tradition
of Anglo-American law against suicide, and declared that new
substantive rights must be deeply rooted in legal tradition and precisely formulated or they will not be recognized. 81 The Rehnquist
majority stated that Cruzan was not based on some abstract notion
82
of autonomy, but rather grew out of the common law of battery.
On the other hand, P.A.S. was not such a fundamental right. Following Cruzan's logic, the Court concluded that the Washington
law against P.A.S. was rationally related to government interests,
and that the state has an interest in preventing suicide without regard to quality of life. 83 The state also has a rational interest in
maintaining physicians' role as healers, protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial
pressure to end their lives, and in avoiding the slippery slope towards active euthanasia.84
With respect to the Equal Protection issue in Quill, the Supreme Court stated that the use of intent is firmly rooted in the law
as a basis for distinguishing between two acts that have the same
result. 85 New York's law makes a rational distinction between the
two different groups of patients, those that can refuse unwanted
treatment versus those who would need affirmative intervention to
78
79

80
81
82
83
84
85

See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816, 829.
See id. at 815-16.
See id. at 825-33.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
See id. at 725.
See id. at 728-29.
See id. at 731-33.
See Quill v. Vacco, 521 U.S. 793, 801-03 (1997).
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end their life. 86 With respect to withdrawing treatment, the physician purposefully intends only to "respect his patient's wishes and
'to cease doing useless and futile or degrading things to the patient'. . . [A] doctor who assists a suicide, however, 'must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made
dead.' ' 87 Thus, echoing Yale Kamisar's sentiments, 88 the Court
held that the act-omission distinction can be validly used by the
state to separate a refusal of treatment (an omission) from that of
suicide (which would require an affirmative act). 89 There is no
right to hasten death; only a right to refuse an unwanted touching. 90
Thus, the current state of the law is that there is no constitutional right to die nor to P.A.S. This may be sound in the sense
that an unrestricted constitutional right raises the problems of
abuse that Professors Tribe and Kamisar focus on. However, the
Supreme Court explicitly left open the possibility for states to legalize P.A.S. by statute if they so chose. Already, Oregon voters
have given their approval to the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 91
by a 60 to 40 percent margin, 92 and surely many states will respond in various ways to legalize, ban, and otherwise regulate
P.A.S. This squares well with Justice Louis Brandeis' desire to see
states as the "laboratories of experimentation, ' 93 but will inevitathat we might
bly lead to such contradictory results between states
94
ask whether Congressional legislation is desired.
86

See id.

87

Id.

88 See Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support Physician-Assisted Suicide-And Why These Reasons Are Not Convincing, 12 Issues L. & Med. 113, 120-28
1996).
9 See Quill, 521 U.S. at 807-09.
90 See id.
91 Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-97 (1998), amended by
1999 Or. Laws Ch. 423.
92 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Resists Federal Action on Assisted Suicides,
Milwaukee J. & Sentinel, Nov. 18, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21548460.
93 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (analogizing states to laboratories in need of the freedom to experiment).
94 See David Lawder, Assisted Suicide Debate May Rage in States, Reuters, June 27,
1997 (discussing the argument by Susan Wolf, Professor of Law and Medicine at the
University of Minnesota, that varying state regulations will certainly force many chronically ill patients to move across state boundaries at the end of life simply to commit suicide). See also infra Part IV, Section E.
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II. THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING PHYSICIANASSISTED SUICIDE

Now that we have examined the legal jurisprudence behind the
right to die, we must focus on the ethical arguments for and
against P.A.S. before we can address the added dangers managed
care poses, and the various attempts by states and countries to legalize and regulate the practice. Somewhat counter-intuitively,
utilitarian and deontological arguments are present on both sides
of the debate, contrary to the stereotype of supporters' utilitarian
perspective versus opponents' deontological rights-based approach
to the question of assisting in the termination of life. In addition,
the practice of P.A.S. in America involves not just the ethical considerations of the individual, but implicates collective concerns as
well, both of which must be addressed in our nation's P.A.S. policy.
A. Individual Ethical Considerationswith Respect to PhysicianAssisted Suicide
1. Mercy/The Patient's Best Interests
In Harvard Medical School's Clinical Lecture Series, Linda
Emanuel presents an excellent synopsis of the individual ethical
95
considerations in favor of and opposed to the practice of P.A.S.
In support of the practice lies the fundamental principle of
mercy-the idea that some killing is justified if it is to relieve the
brutal and inhumane suffering that many chronic illnesses cause at
the end of life. Coupled with this notion is the fact that many marginally effective treatments aimed at prolonging life fail to serve
the patient's best interests because they have little chance of real
success and instead only exacerbate patient suffering and quality
of life. This view is supported by New England Journal of Medicine executive editor Marcia Angell and by Guy Benrubi, the latter
of whom emphasizes that it is the advanced technology of the
modem medical world that often brings people into a state of prolonged anguish as opposed to allowing quicker, less painful, more

95 See Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding
Physician-Assisted Suicide (Linda L. Emanuel ed., 1998).
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natural deaths. 96 Given this technological reality-that medical
treatments may sometimes be the cause of pain rather than the
cure-Benrubi urges that medical professionals are obliged not to
abandon their patients by unwaveringly insisting that P.A.S. is im97
permissible.
Ezekiel Emanuel responds to the above argument by suggesting that pain and suffering is not the main motivation behind
P.A.S. decisions. 98 His assertion is bolstered by evidence presented by Professor Robert Burt and Melinda Lee suggesting that
the primary reason people request P.A.S. is their fear of being a
financial and emotional burden on loved ones, and not out of concern for avoiding pain or furthering their own self-interests. 99
In addition, critics of the "mercy" notion, such as Nancy
Dickey of the American Medical Association ("AMA"), loudly
proclaim that killing human life is an intrinsic evil in and of itself
that flies in the face of the Hippocratic Oath and traditional medical ethics that require a doctor to "do no harm."100 With respect to
this contention though, Dr. Alan Stone, Professor of Law and
Medicine at Harvard, counters that the "do no harm" maxim is
nowhere to be found in the Hippocratic Oath, and increasingly
students at our nation's top medical schools are swearing to a
much less exacting formulation of physicians' ethics formulated
by Louis Lasagna. 0 1 Dr. Angell further refutes the deontological
arguments regarding physicians' ethics, proclaiming, "The highest
ethical imperative of doctors should be to provide care in whatever
96 See Guy Benrubi, Euthanasia-The Need For Procedural Safeguards, 326 New
Eng. J. Med. 197, 198 (1992).See also Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-The Ultimate Right, 336 New Eng. J. Med 50 (1997).
97 See Benrubi, supra note 96. See also Angell, supra note 96.
98 See Ezekiel Emanuel, Empirical Studies on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 6 J.
Clin. Ethics 158, 158-60 (1995).
99

See Robert Burt, Taking Care of Strangers, 1-21, 92-107, 114-21, 124-27, 174-80

(1979); Melinda Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 310, 311 (1996). See also discussion infra Part II, Section
A(4).
I A See Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia: A Concept Whose Time Has Come?, 8 Issues
L. & Med. 521, 523 (1993).
101 See Alan Stone, A Medical Emergency, Boston Globe, June 27, 1997. Students at
UCSF Medical School are now learning and subscribing to Louis Lasagna's "Modem
Hippocratic Oath," which abandons the traditional prohibitions against providing
"deadly medicine" or abortions to patients. See id.
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way best serves patients' interests, in accord with each patient's
wishes, [and] not with a theoretical commitment to preserve life
no matter what the cost in suffering."' 102 She adds, "The greatest
harm we [as doctors and society] can do is to consign a desperate
patient to unbearable suffering--or force the patient to seek out a
10 3
stranger like Dr. Kevorkian."'
2. Act-Omission Distinction
P.A.S. proponents forcefully claim that decisions to act versus
decisions to remain passive are morally indistinguishable. For instance, how can it be ethically sound for a doctor to remove her
patient from a respirator based on the conception that this is
merely an omission of treatment, while if a stranger came along
and removed the plug, it would be a homicide? Furthermore, both
the act (of assisting suicide) and the omission (of withdrawing
treatment) have the result of hastening death, no matter how much
anyone disputes the semantic issue of causation. However, this argument has not carried the day with the U.S. Supreme Court, even
04
if some of the Circuits have been swayed. 1
Noted ethicists Yale Kamisar and Seth Kreimer have devoted
much energy to scholarly pieces emphasizing the distinction between refusal of treatment and P.A.S. In Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, Kamisar opined that there are
significant moral and legal distinctions between killing and letting
die. 10 5 Citing to Daniel Callahan, director of the Hastings Center,
Kamisar uses language quite similar to that employed later by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Quill: "[T]here must be an underlying
fatal pathology if allowing to die is even possible. Killing, by
contrast, provides its own fatal pathology."'1 06 Moreover, Kreimer
addresses the practical implications of the distinction, arguing that
the dangers of allowing P.A.S. are far greater than that of merely
permitting cessation of treatment: "[A] right to refuse treatment
puts at risk only the lives of those who would die without treat102
103
104
105
Det.
106

Angell, supra note 96, at 52.
Id.
See supra Part I, Section F.
See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U.
Mercy L. Rev. 735, 751 (1995).
Id. at 755.
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ment... [while] assisted suicide would extend the risk to the entire population."' 10 7 Many further believe that allowing the affirmative action of P.A.S. presents the additional danger of drastically undermining the trust necessary to08establish a successful and
meaningful doctor-patient relationship. 1
However, Marcia Angell provocatively counters that the actomission distinction that opponents of P.A.S. make is "too doctorcentered and not sufficiently patient-centered."' 0 9 She asserts:
We should ask ourselves not so much
whether the doctor's role is passive or active
but whether the patient's role is passive or active. From that perspective, the three methods
of hastening death line up quite differently.
When life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn
from an incompetent patient at the request of a
proxy or when euthanasia is performed, the
patient may be utterly passive... [and] unaware of the decision. In sharp contrast, assisted suicide, by definition, cannot occur
without the patient's knowledge and participation. Therefore, it must be active-that is to
say, voluntary." 0
That element of voluntariness is a critical distinction, because
it provides an "inherent safeguard against abuse" of P.A.S. that
neither cessation of treatment nor euthanasia offers.' 1 Angell concludes then, that contrary to the frequent assertion that permitting
the "action" of P.A.S. would lead to distrust of doctors, "distrust
would be more likely to arise from uncertainty about whether a
doctor will honor a patient's wishes" (i.e., which would result in a
12
regime where P.A.S. was not an option)."

107 Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey,
and the Right to Die, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 803, 841 (1995),
108 See infra Part III, Section D.
109 Angell, supra note 96, at 51.
110

Id.

111
112

Id.
Id. at52.
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3. Control and Dignity
Thirdly, supporters of P.A.S. assert that dignity lies in control
of one's fate and in the avoidance of being a burden upon loved
ones. Professor Ronald Dworkin expands upon this concept in
Life's Dominion,113 advancing an intellectual argument based on
the distinction between critical and experiential interests (one's
firmly rooted life goals versus her temporary experiential desires).
Dworkin strongly believes we should protect the continuity of
one's life plan by allowing the final chapter of death to conform to
what one's life subjectively meant to her.' 14 If it was important to
the individual that her family never see her in a diminished, deteriorated, and undignified state, we should not prevent that desire
from eventuating. 115 Only in this manner do we respect the ra1 16
tional self's critical interests over her experiential ones.
4. Autonomy/Self-Determination
Dworkin's arguments are founded upon the final and most
crucial ethical consideration that Emanuel presents in favor of
P.A.S.-the combined notion of autonomy, self-determination and
voluntariness. Dworkin believes that the autonomy, best interests,
and sanctity of the person (the three "mortal interests") implore us
to honor the individual's choice with respect to end-of-life decisions.1 17 Dr. Angell is also a champion of self-determination, as
she begins with the generally accepted premise that "one of the
most important ethical principles in medicine is respect for each
113 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 179-217 (1993). As an aside, I note that Judge
Posner believes it is impossible to make a convincing moral argument in either direction
regarding end-of-life choices, and thus Dworkin's article and intellectual framework for
debate should not merely be summarily dismissed even if one disagrees with his views.
See generally Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1637 (1998).

114

See Dworkin, supra note 113, at 200-13.

115
116

See id.
See id.

117 See id. at 190-96. By "autonomy," Dworkin refers to the ability and independence
of the self to govern her own choices. See id. at 190-92. The "best interests" of the patient presents the conflict between a paternalistic assessment of what her best interests
are versus a subjective determination. See id. at 192-94. Dworkin would argue that when
we allow a patient to commit assisted suicide, we are doing it for her, i.e., it is in her best
interests. See id. at 216. Finally, with respect to the "sanctity" of the person, this can be

viewed as both the intrinsic and the personal value of life. For instance, even if a patient
is non-religious, she can believe in the sanctity of life. See id. at 194-96.
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patient's autonomy, and that when this principle conflicts with
others, it should almost always take precedence." ' 1 8 She notes,
"this premise has been incorporated into our laws governing medical practice and research, including the requirement of informed
consent to any treatment.'119 Finally, she emphasizes, "In medicine, patients exercise their self-determination most dramatically
when they ask that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn" (and
20
implicitly, even more powerfully if they could opt for P.A.S.). 1
Nevertheless, while autonomy has thus become something of a
trump card in the debates of recent years, there is merit to the discussion of whether true and full autonomy really exists. Contrary
to Dworkin, Professor Rebecca Dresser believes that most of us do
not have the strong sense of critical interests, autonomy, and continuity of the person necessary to adopt Dworkin's thesis. 1 2' She
asserts that Dworkin omits the fact that people make reevaluations
all the time. Therefore, Dresser argues for a form of "moral paternalism" whereby we should sometimes disregard the autonomy of
person's advanced directive requesting a hastened death.' 22 To
support this view, she asks: if the continuity of one's life plan is
really as crucial as Dworkin and others suggest, then why doesn't
everyone make out an advanced directive? 23 She asserts that there
is no empirical evidence to support the claim that people want narrative coherence, and that the majority of those who actually make
out an advanced directive do so out of a sense of uninformed obligation to their family, not in a quest for self-determination. 24 This
118
119
120
121

AngeIl, supra note 96, at 50.
Id.
Id.
See Rebecca Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Pol-

icy, 25 Hastings Center Rep. 32, 34-38 (1995).
1
See id. at 35-38.
123 Seeid. at 34.
124 See id. at 35. To illustrate the lack of self-determination and informed decisionmaking evident in advanced directives, Dresser cites to a study of dialysis patients who
had issued instructions as to treatment in the event of advanced Alzheimer's disease.
Upon follow up of the patients who had submitted these advanced directives, "two-thirds
of them wanted families and physicians to have some freedom to override the directives." Id. at 35. Furthermore, Dresser notes that a survey of twenty-nine people enrolled
in an advance care planning workshop agreed with both of the following inconsistent
statements: "I would never want to be on a respirator in an intensive care unit"; and "If a
short period of extremely intensive medical care could return me to near-normal condition, I would want it." Id. at 35. See also Lachlan Forrow et al., Advance Directives for
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claim is backed up by a survey of Oregon physicians conducted by
Melinda Lee, which indicated that the vast majority believed patients might request P.A.S. out of "concern about being a burden
125
to others" (93 percent) or "financial pressure" (83 percent).
Furthermore, Professors Robert Burt and Yale Kamisar more
aggressively challenge supporters of the self-determination argu26
ments, openly doubting whether true autonomy is even possible.1
Kamisar expresses skepticism that the choice to end one's life
could ever be sufficiently voluntary, declaring "There is a great
deal to be said.., for Dr. Frohman's pithy comment that the voluntary plan is to be carried out 'only if the victim is both sane and
crazed with pain."" 1 27 While Kreimer believes (and I agree) that
this proclamation goes too far,' 2 8 Burt sides with Kamisar's position, arguing that self-boundaries are decimated by the severe
trauma many P.A.S. candidates experience. 129 Thus, rather than
focus on the personal choice to die, Burt concentrates on its emotional context. He believes that patients are often temporarily depressed and are expressing the desire to avoid helplessness, de1 30 This
pendence, and humiliation rather than the "wish to die."
belief is strengthened by data reviewed by Conwell Yeates and
Eric Caine, who found that "90 to 100 percent of the suicide victims die while they have a diagnosable psychological illness,"
which often is an acute (but treatable) depressive episode that
makes the contention of "rational" suicide quite dubious. 131 If one
accepts this scenario, then allowing unregulated P.A.S. does not
truly respect patient autonomy. While Yeates and Caine's estimates of the incidence of depression and psychological illness
may be high due to liberal interpretations of the categories, they
Medical Care, 325 New Eng. I. Med. 1255 (1991).

125 See Lee et al., supra note 99, at 311.
126 See Burt, supra note 99. See also Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views
Aainst Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 969, 985-93 (1958).
Kamisar, supra note 126, at 985-86.
128 See Kreimer, supra note 107, at 824.
129 See Burt, supra note 99, at 10-13.
130
131

Id. at 12.
Conwell Yeates & Eric Caine, Rational Suicide and The Right To Die-Reality

and Myth, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 1100, 1101 (1991) (citations omitted).;See also Harvey
Max Chochinov et al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Il, 152 Am. J. Psychiatry,
1185 (1995) (finding a correlation between suicidal thoughts and clinical depression

among terminally ill patients).

1999]

Physician-AssistedSuicide

still raise the question of whether it is possible for selfdetermination to exist in all of the contexts in which end-of-life
choices are made.
As such, given the limitations on voluntariness, there is much
to be said for Dr. Stone's emphatic belief, "Let us not simply
genuflect in the direction of total autonomy."' 132 The take-home
lesson is that responsible P.A.S. policy in America must include
strict safeguards to ensure that autonomy of the individual is truly
present before allowing the P.A.S. action to be carried out.
B. Collective Ethical Considerationswith Respect to PhysicianAssisted Suicide
Turning from the individual ethical considerations regarding
P.A.S. to the collective ones, Linda Emanuel suggests five additional arguments can be made. 133
1. Private Versus Public Matters
First, P.A.S. proponents urge that private matters concerning
end-of-life determinations should be free of government or other
outside interference. I note at the outset that this sounds much like
the argument that abortion-rights supporters successfully made in

Roe v. Wade 134 and in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey135 regarding a

woman's privacy right over her body. 136 However, as Kamisar believes, the collective implications of P.A.S. are certainly a matter
of public concern, and even most supporters of the practice would
concede that the state does have a rational interest in the preservation and sanctity of human life. 137 (On the other hand, the weight
of the state's interests versus the private interest would undoubt138
edly be in dispute between proponents and foes of P.A.S. )

132 Lecture given by Dr. Stone at Harvard Law School, November 10, 1997.
133 See Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding
Suicide (Linda L. Emanuel ed., 1998).
Physician-Assisted
1 34
410U.S. 113 (1973).

135

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

136

See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.

137
138

See generally Kamisar, supra note 126.
See supra Part I (discussing the legal history and development of the right to die).
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2. Role of the Medical Profession
Secondly, supporters and opponents of P.A.S. clash over what
I believe to be the most important and difficult collective ethical
consideration-whether medical professionals are at society's
command, or whether they maintain their individual values. If
physicians are at the "command" of their patients and have a duty
as medical professionals to serve their patient's interests as the patient sees them, then would a doctor who refuses to offer P.A.S. to
her patient be serving her own self-interests and values ahead of
her patient's? May a physician who has had a lifelong relationship
with her patient abandon him at the end over a disagreement regarding end-of-life decision-making? On the other hand, will the
open and legalized practice of P.A.S. undermine the collective
139
trust of the public in the entire medical profession?
On balance, I come down on the physicians' side of this debate-i.e., that their role as professionals in our society should not
obligate them to participate in P.A.S. against their will. (However,
relieving physicians of a mandatory duty to participate in P.A.S. is
not at all inconsistent with legalization and regulation of the practice.) Most commentators, including Dr. Angell, agree that no
doctor should be forced to comply with a request for P.A.S. that
runs counter to her values. But then, I wonder how this view is
consistent with Angell's prior assertion that a doctor's first guiding principle should be respect for each patient's autonomy above
all else.1 40 Is there a consistent principle at work, or does it come
down to the realization that forcing all physicians to provide
P.A.S. regardless of their own religious and moral values would be
14 1
political and professional suicide?

139

See infra Part III, Section C (discussing the implications of P.A.S. on the doctor-

patient relationship, especially in light of the rise of managed care).
0
See Angell, supra note 96, at 50.
141 See Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1996). I note that like most commentators, the Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide addresses this concern by similarly relieving physicians of their obligation to participate in
P.A.S. against their will. See id. The authors conclude that it is quite possible to legalize,
implement, and regulate P.A.S. in the United States while not bestowing any absolute
"right" to P.A.S. upon patients. See id. Thus, an individual physician is free to decline to
engage in that option without stripping it from all patients or all doctors. See id.
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3. Legal Trends Versus the Constitution
Emanuel's third collective consideration in support of P.A.S.
focuses on the progression of legal trends over the past two decades that have gravitated towards supporting the expansion of the
right to die. 142 While this may be the case, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion, clearly is based upon the proposition that the U.S. Constitution does not give any indication in support of a right to
P.A.S. 143 As such, without explicit constitutional backing, the Supreme Court had relatively little trouble in dispatching the question given the extreme heat and passion it engenders. 144 Still, the
Court did explicitly allow for the debate to continue in the state
legislatures, and we are certain to see more developments on this
front in the coming years. It is our obligation then to make sure
those developments are sound and responsible ones that respond
effectively to the ethical concerns raised by P.A.S.
4. Legal Restraints and Safeguards Versus the Slippery Slope
Proponents of P.A.S. add that societal legalization of the practice would permit effective restraints and safeguards. Perhaps the
best anecdotal evidence one can offer in support of this argument
is the crusade of Dr. Kevorkian. He had in effect no legal criteria
to adhere to as he traveled around in his suicide van (although he
proclaimed a set of "personal" guidelines), and stories have
emerged that some of his patients were not terminally ill, or felt
pressured into the final decision. 145 Furthermore, colleagues of his
have gotten into the act, recently assisting in a suicide of a woman
whose complaint was, "I am not stressed, oppressed or depressed.
I don't have Alzheimer's and am not terminally ill. But I am 82
years old and I want to die." 146 Needless to say, it is frightening to
think that on this information alone she would have been an appropriate candidate for P.A.S. Professor Robert Sedler argues that
under an explicitly legalized system however, effective controls
142
143
144
145

See
See
See
See

supra Part I (discussing the legal history and development of the right to die).
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri. Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, at 809 (1997).
Kevorkian Associate Said to Assist in Suicide, Reuters, Dec. 4, 1997.

146

Id. (describing how Dr. Georges Reding, a retired psychologist and friend of Kev-

orkian's, aided Martha Wichorek in ending her life given the complaints listed above).
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could be implemented to ensure that the right to P.A.S. is not
abused. 147 I note that this idea is also a fundamental premise behind the Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate PhysicianAssisted Suicide, as the authors present numerous patient and procedural safeguards aimed at preserving48 the benefits of P.A.S.
while minimizing its potential for abuse. 1
However, critics such as Kamisar are adamant that if P.A.S. is
legalized, we will be headed on a certain and destructive path towards active euthanasia. 149 This is the classic slippery slope
nightmare even supporters of P.A.S. cannot ignore. Linda
Ganzini's initial study, Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward
Physician-AssistedSuicide, indicated that 42 percent of those physicians in favor of the practice conceded that it might lead to involuntary euthanasia either moderately or a great deal (62 percent
of opponents of P.A.S. felt this way as well). 150 Additionally, 48
percent of P.A.S. proponents admitted that it may be "misused
with disadvantaged persons" either moderately or a great deal, and
74 percent of opponents agreed. 151 Those numbers cannot be
summarily dismissed no matter what one's personal view on
P.A.S. is, and, therefore, any effort to legalize the practice must
devote substantial attention and detail to the prevention of "slippery slope" abuses. 152
5. Holland's Example-Culture
Nevertheless, as the final collective ethical consideration in
support of legalizing P.A.S., proponents assert that Holland's policy has worked out well. Though P.A.S. has not been explicitly legalized by a governmental body, there is a firm understanding
between the government and its physicians that the latter can en147 See Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I
Say No, 72 U. Det. L. Rev. 725, 726-27 (1995).
14a See Baron et al., supra note 141.
149 See Kamisar, supra note 105, at 749-53.
150 See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 153 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1469, 1472 (1996).
151

Id.

152 1 note that a follow-up study conducted by Ganzini found that the slippery slope
was not a severe problem in Oregon's experience. P.A.S. cases did not rise sharply between 1998 and 1999 (16 cases versus 27 cases), and more importantly, physicians often
attempted to intervene and improve the quality of life for terminally ill patients. See Assisted Suicides Not Rising Sharply in Oregon, Reuters Health, Feb. 23, 2000.
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gage in the practice. Supporters of P.A.S. assert that while detractors of Holland's system declared it would be a devastating lesson
on the perils of the slipperiest slope in medicine, studies have
proven exactly the opposite to be the case. They cite 1990 and
1995 studies of P.A.S. supported by the Royal Dutch Medical Association which concluded that there is no evidence that "physicians in the Netherlands are moving down a slippery slope." 153 In
response, critics make the general contention that the culture
prevalent in the Netherlands that allows this to be the case is not
safely reproducible in America. We have no national health insurance, and more and more, managed care is introducing economic
incentives that would send us rapidly skidding down the slippery
154
slope in the U.S.
More decisively, a commentary by Hendin published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association directly refuted the
results offered by the Dutch studies, contending that the Dutch experience has been far from an unqualified success. 155 Hendin offers evidence that the Dutch guidelines have failed to adequately
protect patients, citing that 50 percent of physicians reported it
would be "appropriate to suggest euthanasia to patients." 156 This
raises grave problems with respect to the reality of patient suggestibility, as Kathleen Foley and Richard Coleson have argued
that patients do not have much independent autonomy of their
own, but rather are easily convinced by their doctors' suggestions. 157 Moreover, Hendin's commentary asserts that death without consent in the Netherlands is not a rarity. In fact, he states that
the 1990 study revealed that in 0.8 percent of the deaths (more
than 1000 cases) due to P.A.S. in the Netherlands each year, "physicians admitted they actively caused death without explicit con153 Herbert Hendin et aL, Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Lessons From the Dutch, 277 JAMA 1720, 1720 (1997) (quoting P.J. Van der
Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life
t1992)).
54 See infra Part III (discussing Managed Care).
155 See Hendin et. al., supra note 153, at 1720-22.
156

Id. at 1721 (citation omitted).

157 See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs: Verbatim
Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 Issues L. & Med. 13 (1997); Kathleen M.
Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician Assisted Suicide, 336 New
Eng. J. Med. 54, 55 (1997). See also infra Part III, Section D (discussing patient suggestibility).
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sent of the patient."1 58 Finally, Hendin cites to other studies indicating "voluntariness is compromised, alternatives are not pre159
sented, and the criterion of unrelievable suffering is bypassed."'
Thus, given the mixed reviews on the Dutch experience and
the fundamental differences in the financial structure of American
versus Dutch health care, P.A.S. supporters in the United States
have good reason to be cautious in implementing our nation's
policy.
C. Interim Observations
Whether one comes into the P.A.S. debate as an enthusiastic
supporter or rabid opponent, it is clear that compelling individual
and collective ethical considerations are present on both sides of
the issue. Perhaps this is why Judge Richard Posner has concluded
that there is no way to make a convincing moral argument on either side of the debate.160 My own personal belief is that the ethical arguments detailed in support of allowing the practice are on
balance more persuasive with respect to allowing carefully regulated P.A.S., but proving that is not the intention of this paper.
Rather, the purpose is to consider all of these arguments, as well as
the added dimension of managed care, 161 in formulating sound
P.A.S. law and policy in America today.
III. THE IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE ON THE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE DEBATE

Now that we have a legal and ethical framework in which to
ground the debate over P.A.S., we must consider the dramatic impact managed care has had on health care policy and practice in
America. The rise of managed care raises a host of serious dilemmas that careful and responsible P.A.S. policy must evaluate and
guard against. 162
158

Hendin et al., supra note 153, at 1721.

159

Id. at 1722 (citations omitted).

160 See Posner, supra note 113.
161 See infra Part HI (discussing the implications of managed care on P.A.S. policy).
162 For a more comprehensive discussion of the risks posed by managed care than that
which is offered in this paper, see Jefferson Smith, Physician Assisted Suicide, (1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia. Journal of Social Policy & the Law).
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A. FinancialIncentives and United States Health Care
Expenditures
The International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force opened its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Quill by proclaiming,
"managed care has changed the very basis upon which health care
is provided."' 163 This was not mere litigation hyperbole. For the
better part of this century, health care was provided on a fee-forservice basis marked by large insurance companies (most prominently, Blue Cross/Blue Shield), paying out even larger sums to
doctors and hospitals. Under the fee-for-service system, providers
were paid for each service they performed, and hence had a financial incentive to exhaust all treatments possible, and even to provide unnecessary care since the more health care that was provided, the greater the provider's income.
Not surprisingly, as the data presented by Joseph Califano and
the Health Care Financing Administration attest, U.S. health care
expenditures have spiraled nearly out of control to approximately
14 percent of total U.S. Gross National Product today (roughly $1
trillion annually, or 20 percent of America's entire national
debt).164 Katharine Levit's study found that Medicare spending has
continued its dramatic growth (on the order of 10 percent per annum), in great part due to our increased lifespan made possible by
advances in modem medical technology. 165 Edward Schneider's
research further indicates that a good percentage of America's
aging population will be afflicted with some form of chronic illness, and that means the need for expensive "medical care in later
life [is] likely to increase substantially."' 166

163 Brief Amicus Curiae of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force in Support
of Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858), availablein 1996 WL
656322.
164 See Joseph A.Califano, Jr., America's Health Care Revolution: Who Lives? Who
Dies? Who Pays? 164-66, 173-78 (1986).
165 See Katharine R. Levit et al., Health Care Spending in 1994: Slowest in Decades,
Health Aff. 130, 135 (1996). Levit found that although overall health care expenditures
are not growing at nearly the rate they used to, likely due to the new pressures managed
care has added on all plans, Medicare spending is continuing to increase rapidly. See id.
166 Edward L. Schneider & Jacob A. Brody, Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity: Another View, 309 New Eng. J. Med. 854 (1983).
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Thus, when one couples America's aging population together
with the fact that Medicare enrollment in managed care organizations is rapidly rising, 16 7 a conflict is brewing that will directly
determine the amount of (and whether) care will be given to
chronically ill, elderly patients in the future. This problem is particularly acute given that 40 percent of total Medicare expenditures come in the last few months of life, 168 making it a fertile area
in which HMOs will try desperately to slash costs, perhaps even
encouraging P.A.S. to inappropriate candidates. The managed care
industry knows that Maxwell's Paradox is indeed true-the more
169
we spend now on health care, the more we must spend later.
Keeping people alive when they are younger means that they will
be alive when they are older so that they may die of prohibitively
expensive illnesses like cancer instead. Hence, Thurow points out
that it is quite evident that the need to control costs is real if
70
America is to avoid bankrupting its health care delivery system. 1
But many wonder if a new regime focusing on controlling costs is
compatible with the presence of legalized and unregulated P.A.S.
Nevertheless, riding to the rescue is managed care. Managed
care plans have enjoyed a meteoric surge in enrollment in the past
ten to fifteen years. 17 1 HMOs have snuck in without excessive
protest because they control costs while often not explicitly
changing the benefits that patients are entitled to receive. Instead,
they cut costs by controlling the costly treatment decisions that
doctors used to make when they were at the center of the health
care universe. (For instance, when and how long to hospitalize a
patient, what medical procedures to order, when a patient should
see a specialist, etc.) In this manner, the plan effectively regulates
physicians' standard of care down to the managed care standard.
167

See National Center for Health Statistics, Health Maintenance Organizations and

Enrollment (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchswww/fastats/hinsure.htm>
[hereinafter NCHS, Health Maintenance Organizations and Enrollment] (HMOs have
increased in market share from approximately 4 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent in 1994).

168

The dramatically high percentage of Medicare expenditures in the final months of

life is a direct result of prohibitively expensive but marginally effective end-of-life care.

See generally Schneider & Brody, supra note 166. See also generally John Morrow &
Arch B. Edwards, U.S. Health Manpower Policy: Will the Benefits Justify the Costs?, 51
J. Med. Educ. 791, 795 (1976).

169
170
171

See Morrow & Edwards, supra note 168, at 795.
See Lester Thurow, Learning to Say "No", 311 New Eng. J. Med. 1569 (1984).
See NCHS, Health Maintenance Organizations and Enrollment, supra note 167.
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The financial incentives for HMOs to act in this way are no
mystery. Put simply, managed care organizations have a direct financial incentive to limit care and control costs because every
dollar patients pay into the plan that is not spent on care (or on
administrative costs) remains in the plan's coffers. This incentive
to limit money spent on care is passed on to the plan's physicians
in several ways. First, there is the omnipresent threat of termination if a doctor orders more services than her plan deems appropriate. 172 Second, rather than having physicians compensated solely
by salary, a significant portion of physician remuneration increasingly comes through "bonuses" paid at year end based on the lack
of services ordered (also known as a "withhold"). 173 Finally, some
managed care plans pass on all of the risk of providing excess care
174
to their doctors by paying them an up front "capitation fee."'
This entails payment of a flat fee per patient, and in return, the
physician is responsible for providing all medical services for each
covered patient. Thus, critics, such as the Ad Hoc Committee to
Defend Health Care, argue that managed care has caused a shift
from doctor as fiduciary to doctor as a steward of resources, conflicted between her obligation to the patient versus her obligation
75
to a community of covered lives. 1
Even absent any self-interested manipulation by physicians,
Seth Kreimer and Daniel Spencer worry that if unregulated P.A.S.
is a viable option under managed care, the plans' financial incentives will seriously dampen interest in seeking out state-of-the-art
palliative care. 176 This would be particularly troublesome given
172 See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Ga Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 433, 441-43 (1996).
17I See John R. Penhallegon, Emerging Physician and Organization Liabilities Under
Managed Health Care, 64 Def. Couns. J. 347 (1997).
174 See id. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task
Force in Support of Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858),
availablein 1996 VL 656322.
175 See Kathleen Spiessbach, Protest Against Profit-Driven Health Care, Reuters, Dec.
3, 1997. The Ad Hoc Committee To Defend Health Care is a Massachusetts group of
doctors and nurses who published a "call to action" letter in The Journal of the American
Medical Association, denouncing the "canons of commerce" which threaten to "transform healing from a covenant into a business contract." See id.
176 See Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe,
Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 803, 827 (1995). See also Donald E.
Spencer, Practical Implications for Health Care Providers in a Physician-Assisted Suicide Environment, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 545, 551 (1995).
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pain expert Kathleen Foley's assertion that the availability of adequate control of pain and suffering could eliminate most requests
for suicide. 177 In response though, Marcia Angell calls "illogical"
the argument that permitting P.A.S. would divert resources from
comfort care. She states, "[g]ood comfort care and the availability
of physician-assisted suicide are no more mutually exclusive than
good cardiologic care and the availability of heart transplantation." 17 8 While there may be some truth in this proposition, the
majority of literature discussing incentives for investing resources
in palliative care given the financial conflict of interest comes
down on Kreimer's and Spencer's side of the debate. 179
In the end then, under managed care, the price to be paid for
expensive, marginally beneficial treatment to patients at the end of
life comes both out of the plan's pockets and those of its physicians as well. In this system, when one factors in the rapidly increasing Medicare enrollment in HMOs, can an elderly, chronically ill patient help but be skeptical of the plan's financial
motivation in providing care and potentially suggesting P.A.S.?
Kreimer emphasizes the severity of this dilemma, warning that
"[p]articularly with the emergence of cost controls and managed
care in the United States, the danger of tempting health care providers to persuade chronic patients to minimize costs by ending it
all painlessly is no fantasy."' 180 As such, any well-formulated
P.A.S. policy in America should diligently guard against the possibility that physicians, especially those in HMOs who are keeping
a watchful eye on their wallets, might suggest or encourage P.A.S.
to vulnerable patients. Absolutely no conscientious human being
would opt for a policy where managed care cost controls take
precedence over the will and autonomy of an individual who potentially is unable to make strong decisions on her behalf in a time
177 See Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to
Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. Pain & Symptom Mgmt. 289, 290
(1991); but cf. Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-The
Ultimate Right, 336 New Eng. J. Med. 50, 50 (1997).
178 Angell, supra note 177, at 51 (1997).
179 See Assisted Suicides Not Rising Sharply in Oregon, Reuters Health, Feb. 23,
2000 (discussing latest study by Ganzini, et al suggesting that Oregon's legalization of
P.A.S. may actually improve palliative care by encouraging physicians to intervene and
improve the quality of life for terminally ill patients).
180 Kreimer, supra note 176, at 841.
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conducive to tragic weakness.
B. Managed Care Gag Clauses
Furthermore, less known to the lay public is that managed care
gag rules curb what doctors can tell their patients about expensive
alternative treatments. 181 Hence, there is a real danger that information and options to patients will be chilled, and P.A.S. will no
longer be used solely as a last resort. For instance, a recent notice
to doctors working for the Kaiser Permanente HMO in Ohio
stated, "Do not discuss proposed treatment with Kaiser Permanente members prior to receiving authorization" from an outside
182
company that "sets guidelines for the treatment of patients."' It is
not inconceivable under this regime that a managed care physician
may be forbidden to tell her patient that there is a slight chance for
long term survival if he undergoes radical radiation at prohibitive
cost. The case of Ray Mount, a Massachusetts psychologist who
formerly contracted with CIGNA, illustrates this point. After being
fired within one month of suggesting a patient receive treatment
that the plan deemed unnecessary, Mount commented, "you just
don't risk making [HMOs] angry."' 183 Furthermore, plans such as
Aetna protect themselves in this respect by defining "medical necessity" and "covered services" interchangeably, allowing the plan
to supersede a physician's judgment regarding the necessity of
184
medical service.
Additionally, even when an elderly depressed patient who is
contemplating suicide comes asking for treatment, HMO gag rules
may require doctors to prescribe her less expensive and also less
effective drug therapies than those that are available elsewhere.
For example, a study by Dr. Stephen Bartels found that managed
care patients over age 65 were three times more likely than
younger patients to be prescribed older antidepressants (such as
181 See Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 172, at 441-43.
182 Robert Pear, Doctors Say HMOs Limit What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1995 atAl.
183 Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 172, at 443.
184 See Sarah A. Klein, Health Plan Has All the Power, Am. Med. News, Dec. 1, 1997
(concluding after an analysis of the terms that Aetna US Healthcare requires of its Florida physicians that there were serious power imbalances between plans and their physicians).

78

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:1

tricyclics) than newer and more efficacious serotonin reuptake inhibitors ("SSRIs"). 185 Bartel indicated that this was quite crucial,
stating "we know that SSRIs are associated with less side effects
among older persons," including mental confusion. 186 When this
finding is coupled with the data Ganzini, Yeates, and Chochinov
independently present on the strong correlation between depression and patient requests for P.A.S., the effect of managed care
gag rules upon what doctors can offer their patients is seriously offensive to our notions of a just social-medical policy. 187 Additionally, a study by Dr. Charles Cleeland found that treatment for pain
related to cancer is often not part of the dialogue that takes place
between the health care professional and the patient. 188 As such, if
patients are going to get treatment for pain, they have to initiate
that part of the dialogue. 189 Hence, there is no question that a responsible P.A.S. policy in America must insert safeguards that ensure managed care financial incentives and gag clauses do not
limit the patient's options for treatment as described above.
Furthermore, not surprisingly, managed care gag clauses also
prohibit physicians from informing patients that doctors who save
money by withholding care get financial bonuses. 190 According to
Julia Martin and Lisa Bjerknes, plans often "prohibit disclosure of
the... physician payment and incentive structure, effectively prohibiting discussion of the physician's conflict of interest." 19 1 When
asked what purpose these clauses serve for patient interests, Susan
M. Pisano, a spokeswoman for Group Health Association of
America, claimed that they are a legitimate way to "discourage
doctors from disparaging HMOs and encourage them to discuss
185

See HMO Care of Older Depressed Lacking, Reuters, Oct. 28, 1997 (discussing

the results of Dr. Bartels' study, which was published in 27 Int'l J. Psychiatry Med. 215).
186 Id.
187 See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 153 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1469, 1472 (1996); Conwell Yeates & Eric
Caine, Rational Suicide and The Right To Die-Reality and Myth, 325 New Eng. J.
Med. 1100, 1101 (1991); Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1185 (1995) (finding a correlation between suicidal
thoughts and clinical depression among terminally ill patients).
188 See Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer, 330 New Eng. J. Med. 592, 594-95 (1994).
189 See id.
190 See Pear, supra note 182.

191

Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 172, at 443.
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their concerns about payment and treatment policies with doctors
and physician managers in the health plan, rather than with patients."1 92 David F. Simon, senior vice president of U.S.
Healthcare, added that "the purpose was to protect patients, to
make sure they were not put in the193middle of economic disputes
between doctors and the company."'
While I cannot be sure of the reader's take on these comments,
I do not find them believable or reasonable. The motive behind
these gag clauses is so patently economic that it stretches the
imagination to ponder how executives of HMOs could say otherwise with a straight face. I find myself in complete agreement with
the response of the AMA's ethics authority, the Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, which declared recently "that doctors should
inform patients of all relevant financial inducements, including incentives to limit care." 194
Quite disturbingly, we must conclude that both financial and
informational limitations imposed by managed care indicate that
unregulated P.A.S. has the potential to become a method to control
costs rather than a way to respect patients' autonomy to end their
lives in a merciful and compassionate manner.
C. Would Managed Care Lead to CompetitionBetween Plans
Based on Physician-AssistedSuicide Policy?
Another potential development that would not be implausible
in today's managed care environment is that of competition between plans based on their end-of-life policies. For example,
Leonard Fleck asks the pointed question: would an individual be
able to choose "to join a Medicare HMO that offered substantial
supplementary social services to their elderly clients in exchange
for their agreeing to give up access to... marginally beneficial,
expensive, end-of-life care?"' 195 The HMOs would argue that this
policy simply serves the interests of efficiency and patient autonomy-if someone desires to pay lower plan premiums in return for
192
193
194

Pear, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.

195 Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Rationing, 72 U.
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 873, 878 (1995).
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foregoing expensive measures late in life, then so be it.
The moral and ethical problems with this kind of competitive
system are seriously disturbing. For one, it allows individuals to
bargain around the sanctity of human life. Furthermore, as cost
pressures mount, the line between what is a marginally beneficial,
unworthwhile end-of-life treatment will inevitably creep in a direction adverse to patient interests. And moreover, this kind of
price competition over end-of-life decisions will undoubtedly have
a disproportionately discriminatory impact on the poor and members of minority groups. 196 For example, Dr. Cleeland's study recently confirmed that Hispanic and African-American cancer patients are less likely than whites to receive adequate treatment for
pain, 197 increasing the chance they would find P.A.S. a more palatable outcome.
Thus, serious ethical problems are posed by legalized, unregulated P.A.S. combined with the financial and informational
realities of today's managed care environment. When the powerful
and positive social values of efficiency and respect for patient
autonomy collide without any restraining safeguards, the result is
198
far too likely to be morally pernicious.
D. The Effect of ManagedCare and Physician-AssistedSuicide on
the Doctor-PatientRelationship
While managed care's financial incentives and gag clauses
have an obvious influence on the amount of health care provided,
they have only a slightly more subtle deleterious effect on the
doctor-patient relationship. Traditionally, there has been a paternalistic ethic in the medical profession---doctors do what is best
for their patients given their expertise and duty to serve their patient's interest above all else. 19 9 The Hippocratic Oath, which en196 See Charles J. Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness, and Euthanasia, 9
Issues L. & Med. 151, 164 (1993).
197 See generally Cleeland et al., supra note 188 (indicating that minority patients receive inferior pain control to that received by white patients, and so are more likely to
"voluntarily" opt for P.A.S.).
198 See Daniel Sulmasy, Managed Care and Managed Death, 155 Archives Internal
Med. 133, 136 (1995). See also Fleck, supra note 195, at 886.
199 See Alan A. Stone, Law's Influence on Medicine and Medical Ethics, 312 New
Eng. J. Med. 309, 311 (1985).
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joins physicians not to "give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for
it, nor make a suggestion to this effect, ' 200 is founded upon the
conception of a doctor's role as healer who does no harm. Moreover, Kreimer states that "the patient's acquiescence in invasive or
dangerous treatment rests in part on the faith that the power the
physician exercises is directed [solely] toward the patient's recovery." 20 ' While strict paternalism has given way to expanded in20 2
formed consent and patient autonomy in the last two decades,
the impact of managed care seriously threatens the trusting relationship between physician and patient.
Even without managed care in the picture, heated debates have
raged over the ramifications that the practice of P.A.S. would have
on public confidence in the medical profession. In Oregon for example, Ganzini's study indicated that 31 percent of psychiatrists
opposed to P.A.S. believed it would result in "a great deal" of distrust of physicians, while only 9 percent of supporters thought that
such a threat would materialize.2 03 Now, within the growing context of managed care, if P.A.S. became part of a doctor's repertoire of available "treatments," Dougherty proclaims that patients
would certainly begin to question, "Is my doctor's advice that
there is nothing left for me but euthanasia motivated by my best
interest or his, by concern for my suffering, or for her delivery
network?" 204 Kreimer adds that the doctor-patient relationship will
be further strained in a managed care environment, because personal encounters between physicians and patients are less common
and shorter than ever before. 20 5 Many other medical and legal
scholars, including Dougherty and Fleck, have made persuasive
cases that the public will lose a great deal of trust in the medical
profession "when the role of healer becomes conflated with that of
killer. 20 6

200 Hippocratic Oath, reprintedin Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty, Biomedical
Ethics 50 (3d ed. 1981).
201 Kreimer, supra note 176, at 829.
202 See Stone, supra note 199, at 312.
203 See Ganzini et al., supra note 187, at 1472.
204 Dougherty, supra note 196, at 164.
205 See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 829.
206 Dougherty, supra note 196, at 164. See also Fleck, supra note 195, at 886-88.
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A compelling example of the impact that P.A.S. coupled with
managed care would have on the doctor-patient relationship is detailed by Sulmasy and Fleck. 20 7 Sulmasy paints a picture of Mrs.
Jones, an unfortunate woman approaching the final stages of Lou
Gehrig's disease. Her HMO physician emphasizes that her plan is
cotmitted to respecting all of her rights: both the right to all the
care that she finds ameliorates her painful condition, as well as her
right to refuse any dehumanizing, death-prolonging interventions
she might be offered. The doctor shares his empathy for her tragic
situation, affirming he will do everything possible to make her
comfortable. However, he points out that palliative care can accomplish only so much, and that there is nothing dignified about
incontinence or being placed on a ventilator. In conclusion, he offers that she does have a "right" to a speedier death, and can request aid-in-dying if she feels that would be best to relieve the
burden that she and her family will have to endure. This line of
persuasion has a decidedly eerie ring to it given Burt and Lee's assertions that most people opt for P.A.S. not out of a quest for selfdetermination, but rather out of a sense of not wanting to become a
financial liability on the shoulders of their family. 20 8 When one
considers Lee's evidence indicating that 93 percent of physicians
in Oregon believe that concern about being a burden to others
would be a factor in patient's P.A.S. decision, 20 9 the repercussions
of allowing its unregulated practice in a managed care setting conducive to the above coercion are seriously disturbing.
Thus, the patient is left to resolve by herself whether the suggestion of P.A.S. as an option is the sincere and merciful intention
of a well-meaning physician, or that of one who might possibly be
thinking of his own financial interest passed on by his HMO.
Cynical patients who reflected on the managed care system could
not help but see the personal rewards for their physicians if they
chose to die. 2 10 In addition to undermining patients' trust in their
own doctors, patients may be led to outright hostility, despair, and
207

See Sulmasy, supra note 198, at 133-36; Fleck, supra note 195, at 887.

208

See Robert Burt, Taking Care of Strangers, 1-21, 92-107, 114-21, 124-27, 174-80

(1979); Melinda Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 310, 311 (1996).
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See Lee et al., supra note 208, at 311.
See Fleck, supra note 195, at 887.
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a complete distrust for the entire medical care system. For example, an editorial by Kathleen Foley in The New England Journal of
Medicine refers to evidence indicating that the legalization of
P.A.S. in the Northern Territory of Australia has eroded the Aboriginees' trust in the medical care system. 211 Foley felt that the
Australian experience might serve as a useful example for the
similarly multicultural United States population. "There is concern
that certain patients, particularly members of minority groups that
are estranged from the health care system, may be reluctant to receive treatment for their physical or psychological symptoms because of the fear that their physicians will, in fact, hasten
death. ' 212 However not all medical-ethical scholars agree that
permitting P.A.S. would lead patients to distrust their physicians. 213 For example, Dr. Angell believes "distrust is more likely
to arise from uncertainty about whether a doctor will honor a pa214
tient's wishes" to choose P.A.S. in the first place.
Nevertheless, Fleck believes at the very least that physicians of
sound moral character would find themselves tormented with selfdoubt. While wishing to respect their patients' autonomy with respect to end-of-life choices, they would agonize over whether they
had provided their patients with appropriate doses of hope and encouragement, trying not to tip the balance in either direction. 2 15
When one then factors in the reality of resource limits and cost
constraints in managed care, it strains credulity to think that a conscientious physician could go without appropriate regulatory guidance in determining the appropriate amount of care and treatment
to pursue.

21 6

Finally with respect to the doctor-patient relationship is the issue of respect for patient autonomy versus the reality of patient
suggestibility. There is abundant empirical evidence indicating
that physicians exert a great deal of control over the "independent"
choices of their patients merely by presenting them with informa211

See Kathleen M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician As-

sisted Suicide, 336 New Eng. J.Med. 54, 57 (1997).
212 Ic&
213 See supra Part II, Section A(2).
214 Angell, supra note 177, at 52.
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See Fleck, supra note 195, at 887.
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tion and suggestions. Not surprisingly, "studies of patients' preferences for care at the end of life demonstrate that physicians' preferences strongly influence those of their patients. '2 17 Thus, Richard Coleson argues that "the public is suffering from a false
illusion that legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia will give
them greater autonomy. ' 21 8 To the contrary, he cites the Dutch experience with P.A.S. for the proposition that legalizing the practice
actually increases the power and control of doctors who suggest or
encourage it, for they often fail to propose obvious alternatives
and ignore patients' ambivalence about suicide. 2 19 Hence, besides
critics who directly question the integrity of managed care physicians given the financial conflicts they face, there is the additional
and highly significant factor of unconscious or conscious steering
of patient choices by their physicians. Thus, if we are to allow
P.A.S. as an option in our society, especially as an option under
managed care, we must account for this potential danger in order
to ensure the voluntary and autonomous nature of the patient's decision. For instance, the threat of patient suggestibility and the
further deterioration of the doctor-patient relationship might justify a severe limitation or outright ban on the ability of physicians
220
to initiate the P.A.S. discussion.
Hence, in the absence of strict legal safeguards protecting
against potential abuses of P.A.S. in managed care, the combination of perverse financial incentives to limit care, gag clauses to
control the flow of information, and competition to cut costs may
have serious morally pernicious results. 22' Moreover, without
careful regulation of P.A.S., the doctor-patient relationship will be
at best severely threatened, and at worst, reduced to a state of such
distrust that it loses its fiduciary and beneficial character altogether.

217 Foley, supra note 211, at 55.
218 Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs: Verbatim Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 Issues L. & Med. at 87 (1997).
19
220
221

See id.
See infra Part IV, Section D(5) (discussing suggestions for P.A.S. regulation).
See Fleck, supra note 195, at 886.
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IV. EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE AND REGULATE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE

A. General Considerationsin FormulatingPhysician-Assisted
Suicide Policy
Given the spectacular rise in managed care and the legal developments of the past few decades (and especially the Quill decision), the reality in America is that we must prepare the public and
medical profession to act responsibly in a potentially legalized
P.A.S. environment. 222 Regardless of one's moral-ethical stance
on the subject, we must address the crucial considerations in formulating sound P.A.S. policy, for every state is now in a position
to make the practice available if they so choose. We should strive
to achieve regulations that protect patients and minimize the potential abuses of P.A.S., while still preserving it as an option for
autonomous adults. Fundamentally, P.A.S. regulation should ensure that patients are competent and fully informed as to alternatives, and that their decision is voluntary and enduring.
Barry Furrow and Donald Spencer independently lay down basic introductory criteria that serve as a foundation for "setting limits in the dying zone."'223 Furrow emphasizes that the dialogue over
end-of-life decisions must be "out in the open" to help ensure that
vulnerable groups are not exploited. He urges first that limits on
access to treatment be applied fairly across the population, so that
"the poor, the passive, and the uninformed" are not limited in their
treatment options. 224 I do not believe anyone would question the
horrific tragedy of legalized P.A.S. if we found that its implementation vastly and disproportionately cast its net over impoverished,
elderly minorities in the inner city. Spencer supports this fundamental proposition, arguing for specific safeguards to ensure that
the uninformed public knows all reasonable alternatives available. 225 Quite logically, Furrow also states that "treatment deci222 See Donald E. Spencer, Practical Implications for Health Care Providers in a Physician-Assisted Suicide Environment, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 545, 545-47 (1995).
223 Barry Furrow, Setting Limits in the Dying Zone: Assisted Suicide, Scarce Resources, and Hard Cases, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 901, 924-26 (1995). See Spencer,
supra note 222, at 553-56.
224 Furrow, supra note 223, at 924.
225 See Spencer, supra note 222, at 546-50.
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sions or denials should be transparent to all concerned," reflecting
a recognition that managed care organizations often disguise lack
of coverage. 226 "Whatever the decision," Furrow proclaims, "we
are entitled to as much information as possible about its bases, and
to an opportunity to respond to the justifications for limit setting." 227
Spencer further believes that the problem in generating P.A.S.
policy and legislation is not that reasonable professionals disagree
over whether it should be regulated. Rather, physicians on both
sides of the debate agree that we must create patient safeguards,
but the question posed is: how extensive should that regulation be
(keeping in mind it has a cost in terms of patient privacy and physicians' ability to practice)? 22 8 "Certain safeguards are nearly universally agreed upon," including that "the person choosing a physician-assisted suicide must. be terminally ill, uncoerced, and
competent to make the decision. ' 229 However, there is disagreement about how far such public policy safeguards should go in order to ensure appropriate protection to patients at a time when they
are vulnerable to coercion and abuse as well as suffering.
Below, I will consider and evaluate specific efforts to ensure
that a patient's decision to opt for P.A.S. is voluntary, informed by
all reasonable alternatives, competent, and free from depression
and coercion. The most popular examples known to the public are
those of the Netherlands and Oregon, both of which serve as useful foundations. However, I believe the best of the models put
forth to date is the Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide ("Model Act"), and as such, I focus the
greatest attention on its provisions. 2 30 Drafted by a team of lawyers, physicians, and academics in Massachusetts, the Model Act
takes great strides to curb the potential dilemmas detailed
throughout this paper while still making P.A.S. available to the
segment of the population that can benefit from it. I feel that with
a few modifications and borrowings from other regulatory exam226

Furrow, supra note 223, at 924-25.

227

Id.

228

See Spencer, supra note 222, at 548.
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230 See Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1996).
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ples, the Model Act is the direction in which legislatures should
head when formulating P.A.S. policy.
B. Physician-AssistedSuicide Criteriain the Netherlands
As a backdrop, American legislators would be served well to
look to the procedural requirements imposed in the Netherlands.
Although P.A.S. has not been statutorily legalized, there is a firm
understanding between the government and Dutch physicians that
allows and attempts to regulate the practice.
Aida Koury describes how the Netherlands safeguards the
public with five stringent criteria. 231 First, the patient must be experiencing "lasting and unbearable physical and mental suffering." 232 I immediately note that defining such a criterion is a tremendously difficult and subjective task, something the authors of
the Model Act wrestled with as well. 233 Secondly, the patient must
have a clear understanding of the available alternatives. This is a
substantially different requirement than merely presenting the patient with her options, and one that would do well to be added to
American P.A.S. policy. Third, the decision must be voluntary, a
troublesome but essential requirement the Model Act attempts to
ensure. Next, there must be no other reasonable alternative for the
patient to pursue. I believe this condition to be a bit strong and
potentially problematic with respect to who should be the party
interpreting what is a "reasonable alternative." For example, the
decision to opt for P.A.S. in the first place is certainly not one
which all reasonable people are likely to agree with. Finally, the
Dutch system requires that "the manner of death must not cause
unavoidable misery to others. ' 234 This sounds completely sensible
at first blush, but I wonder if it is ever possible that death by
P.A.S. might not cause misery to some.
Hence, while I believe all of the factors governing the practice
of P.A.S. in the Netherlands are worthy of consideration in America, I worry that some, especially the reasonableness and manner
231 See Aida A. Koury, Physician-Assisted Suicide for the Terminally IIl: The Ultimate Cure?, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 677, 697 (1991).
232

Id.

233
234

See infra Part IV, Section D.
Koury, supra note 231, at 697.
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of death requirements, may not be practical (or even good) to implement in the United States. The Dutch policy does provide
measures to ensure that the patient's choice is informed, but it
needs greater safeguards to guarantee that the patient is competent,
and that her decision is enduring and truly voluntary. Methods to
accomplish these latter criteria are discussed in conjunction with
235
the Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate P.A.S.
C. Oregon's Measure 16-The Death with Dignity Act
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act is the most famous of
2 36
American experiments with legalizing and regulating P.A.S.
Passed originally in November of 1994 when voters narrowly approved a ballot initiative, it was quickly barred by an injunction
and underwent three years of legal wrangling. Opponents were
initially victorious in persuading United States District Court
Judge Michael Hogan to rule the measure unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds, because it failed to offer terminally ill
persons the same protections against suicide afforded to the majority.237 However, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision in
Lee v. Oregon,2 38 holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing since
there was no clear risk of injury. 239 The plaintiffs then unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court, with lead attorney James Bopp
arguing that the Ninth Circuit had taken "the untenable position
that persons must be in the throes of suicidal depression and
240
seeking assistance in killing themselves before bringing suit.
Before the Act could take effect though, opponents were able to
obtain yet another vote on the matter. Bringing a close to the suspense, Oregon citizens supported the measure again, this time by a
decisive 60 to 40 percent margin.241 In 1998, the first year for
235

See infra Part IV, Section D.

236

Or. Rev. Stat. § 127 (1998), amended by 1999 Or. Laws Ch. 423. It was not the

first such experiment however, as states such as California, Washington, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, and New Hampshire have all addressed the topic of euthanasia or P.A.S. in

some manner.
237 See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1283 (9th Cir. 1997).
238
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which statistics are available, 16 patients used the measure to end
2 42
their lives.
Under the Oregon law, an attending physician may prescribe a
lethal dose of medication to a terminally ill patient for selfadministration. 24 3 To be eligible, the patient must be a competent
adult resident of Oregon who is expected to live less than six
months. 244 She must make one written and two oral requests for
P.A.S. during a fifteen day period. 245 To help protect against coercion of vulnerable patients by their physicians (which is especially
crucial in today's era of managed care), a second doctor must confirm the diagnosis, the patient's decision-making capacity, and the
voluntary nature of the request.2 46 In addition, if the patient's decision seems to be impaired by depression or other psychiatric dis247
orders, referral to a mental health professional is mandatory.
The Oregon Act also requires its physicians to ask the patient to
disclose their decision to family members, but the patient is not
forced to do so. 24 8 Finally, doctors must report their participation
in P.A.S. to the state health division, but are protected from pro249
fessional censure and legal liability for their actions.
Critics have challenged the adequacy of the Oregon safeguards
however. Melinda Lee's study of Oregon physicians revealed that
half of those surveyed felt that they could not be certain they could
predict whether a patient would die within six months. 250 While
this is not something to disregard, this problem is not very likely
to cause great potential for abuse. More seriously, Ganzini's first
study of P.A.S. in Oregon reported that psychiatrists believed the
fifteen day waiting period between the first request for P.A.S. and
its administration was not sufficient to protect against a patient's
Milwaukee J. & Sentinel, Nov. 18, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 21548460.
242 See Assisted Suicides Not Rising Sharply in Oregon, Reuters Health, Feb. 23,
2000
243
244
245
246
247
248
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transitory desire to die. 2 51 If this is accurate, sound P.A.S. policy

should consider extending the time required, as well as more stringently assessing the patient's state of mind. Perhaps a mandatory
referral to a mental health professional would be in order even in
cases where the treating physician does not suspect the patient is
depressed. However, Ganzini asserted that the requirement of referral to a psychiatrist in the case of a depressed patient would not
be very effective. In support of this proposition, she presented survey data of Oregon psychiatrists which indicated that 51 percent
were not confident that they could adequately assess from a single
evaluation whether a mental disorder such as depression was influencing a patient's decision. 252 Ganzini noted that psychiatrist's
confidence was significantly increased if they had a longer relationship with the patient.25 3 We must also keep in mind the possibility that selection bias may have occurred with respect to those
psychiatrists who returned surveys. One might reasonably expect
that physicians who felt strong moral or religious convictions
against P.A.S. would be more likely to make their voices heard
than those who supported or were merely not opposed to the practice.
Indeed, a follow-up study conducted by Ganzini in 1999 found
that many of the physicians' concerns were not realized. 254 Data
showed that the number of assisted suicides did not rise sharply
between 1998 and 1999 (16 cases versus 27 cases), quelling fears
that legalization would result in a rapid escalation of deaths.

255

More importantly, the study suggested that physicians often attempted to intervene and improve the quality of life for terminally
ill patients. Thus, the mere availability of P.A.S. may be responsible for improved palliative care which deters suicides in the first
place.
Overall, I believe the Oregon Death with Dignity Act takes
several sound precautions to ensure patient autonomy, competence, and diagnosis, but perhaps could be bolstered somewhat to
251 See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 153 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1469, 1471-72 (1996).
252 See id. at 1473.
253 See id.
254 See Assisted Suicides Not Rising, supra note 242.
255 See id.
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achieve greater protection of vulnerable patients. Measures should
be included to inform patients of all of their alternatives, especially the availability of palliative care. Patients must understand
their options if autonomy and self-determination are to mean anything. Despite this shortcoming, the Oregon law does add a good
measure of certainty to liability-wary physicians who might not
have participated in P.A.S. previously, a factor which the public
debate on the subject frequently neglects. The Model Act takes the
framework laid down by Oregon and creates a detailed structure in
which P.A.S. may be more safely practiced in America.
D. The Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate PhysicianAssisted Suicide
Given the above regulatory examples, and considering all of
the moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas P.A.S. presents (especially
those caused by the added dimension of managed care), a team of
lawyers, physicians, and academics in Massachusetts recently developed "A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate PhysicianAssisted Suicide. '256 The Model Act takes its foundation from the
regulatory models described above, but has expanded coverage
and procedural safeguards designed to minimize the potential for
abuse while preserving P.A.S. as a legal option for the segment of
the population which stands to benefit from it. Its authors submitted a persuasive article in the Harvard Journal on Legislation in
conjunction with the Model Act that aids in illuminating its purposes and features.
1. The Need for the Model Act
The authors emphasize three critical reasons for the need for
an explicit statutory authorization of P.A.S. 257 First, they argue
that even if laws restricting P.A.S. in some states are struck down
or state legislatures fail to speak on the subject, explicit regulation
is still necessary to provide thorough oversight and protection
against abuse of the practice. 258 Second, a statute "more clearly requires and establishes the public support" necessary for such a
256
257
258

See generally Baron et al., supra note 230.
See id. at 7-9.
See id. at 9.

92

VirginiaJournal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:1

controversial practice. 25 9 Third, it provides a measure of legal
certainty to well-meaning physicians who wish to serve their patient's best interests but fear liability due to the current absence of
legislative action in most states. 260 While Dr. Kevorkian's crusade
enjoyed unprecedented success in bringing the practice of P.A.S.
to the media forefront, the unregulated individual actions taken by
him and doctors similarly situated provide for none of the purposes that the Model Act and other analogous legislation accom261
plishes.
Relying upon the newfound certainty fostered by the Model
Act, the authors argue that physicians will be able to consult
openly with and seek advice from colleagues and other professionals, presumably enhancing the quality of their decisionmaking. 262 In comparison, as Troyen Brennan notes, physicians
have access to a wide variety of professional consultations, frequently including review by ethics committees, in conjunction
with other profoundly serious ethical issues. 26 3 Additionally, a
regulated system such as the Model Act's, which requires monitoring and enforcement by the State Department of Health, will
ensure accountability on the part of physicians and eliminate renegade "Kevorkians." Moreover, in line with concerns expressed by
Dr. Angell, explicit legislation that preserves the option of P.A.S.
for patients will prevent numerous premature suicides that occur
259
260

Id. at 7.
See id. at 8-9. With respect to physicians' fears of liability, I note that Lee's survey

of Oregon physicians indicated that 53 percent worried that the patient's family would
sue in the absence of statutorily protected P.A.S., and approximately 25 percent were
concerned that writing a prescription for a lethal dose of medication might violate federal
laws, jeopardize their license to practice in another state, or lead to sanctions by hospitals. See Lee et. al., supra note 250, at 311-12.
261
It is impossible to estimate the number of physicians who currently participate surreptitiously in P.A.S., but there are anecdotal accounts virtually every week of other
doctors engaging in P.A.S. with virtually no legal safeguards in place. See, for example,
Kevorkian Associate Said to Assist in Suicide, Reuters, Dec. 4, 1997, which describes a
suicide attended by Georges Reding in which his patient, Martha Wichorek, was not
terminally ill. She wrote in a letter, "I don't have Alzheimer's and am not terminally ill.
But I am 82 years old and I want to die." Id. I shudder to think of the vast potential for
abuses in cases such as hers if P.A.S. occurs in the absence of government legislated
safeguards.
262 See Baron et al., supra note 230, at 8-9.
263 See id. (citing Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics Committees and Decisions to Limit
Care: The Experience at the Massachusetts General Hospital, 260 JAMA 803 (1988)).
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today by terminally ill patients who fear the opportunity to end
their lives may not arise later should their suffering become too
severe to endure. 264 This belief is endorsed by Derek Humphrey
and Kevorkian attorney Geoffrey Fieger, the latter of whom proclaimed at a lecture given at Harvard, "assisted suicide often gives
people the strength to go on living, knowing it is there if things go
' 265
wrong down the line.
2. Requirements for Patient Eligibility
Turning to the specifics of the Model Act, the authors first
propose that active euthanasia be proscribed, and only voluntary
P.A.S. be permitted. 266 This threshold for eligibility is hardly surprising given prior regulatory efforts, and is an essential first step
for assuring the voluntary nature of the patient's act. Sadly though,
in the name of curbing possible abuses of active euthanasia on
vulnerable patients, the Model Act (as well as all of the regulatory
efforts previously discussed) will inevitably haunt some persons
who, due to the fate of their injury or illness, are either incompetent, paralyzed, or otherwise unable to administer the lethal treatment themselves. However, this is a price responsible P.A.S. policy must pay.
Next comes the Model Act's first main departure from Oregon's measure. In defining the individuals eligible for P.A.S., the
authors focused on those who are "terminally ill" (utilizing the
same criteria as Oregon), but also included those who are suffering
from "unrelievable and unbearable distress due to bodily illness,
that is so great that they prefer death. ' 267 The inclusion of this latter category of "unbearable suffering" is sure to arouse significant
criticism and controversy over the slippery slope problem. However, on balance I believe it is a courageous stand to bring in those
individuals who are truly sound cases for P.A.S., and one made
possible and sensible given the strict procedural safeguards the
264 See id. See also Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-The Ultimate Right, 336 New Eng. J. Med. 50, 53 (1997); Derek Humphrey, Final
Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying 103-05
l199 1).
65 Dr. Kevorkian's Attorney Defends Right to Die, Harv. L. Rec., Oct. 10, 1997.
266 See Baron et al., supra note 230, at 9-10.
267
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Act employs. 2 68 The Model Act prevents easy manipulation of the
"unbearable suffering" category by limiting it to those "whose illness is incurable and who subjectively feel that the accompanying
suffering is worse than death. ' 269 The rationale behind this is that
it is not possible to construct a more objective definition that
would not be overly restrictive, and that the desire to end life is an
inherently subjective determination on which rational, autonomous
people differ. Furthermore, in addition to the safeguards detailed
below to protect patients from the slippery slope, it is also essential to recognize that the Model Act does not bestow a "right" to
P.A.S. on any patient. Rather, the physician retains the ability to
270
decide whether the individual case warrants such relief.
3. Four Basic Criteria Designed to Safeguard Patients and
Physicians
To protect patients and physicians, the crux of the Model Act
goes beyond Oregon's and the Netherlands' basic procedures, requiring that four detailed conditions be met before one can receive
P.A.S. The patient must be (1) competent; and (2) fully informed;
27 1
her choice must be (3) voluntary; and (4) enduring.
A "competent" request under § 3(a)(3)(A) is "a reasoned request for physician-assisted suicide from a patient, based on the
patient's ability to understand his or her condition and prognosis,
the benefits and burdens of available alternative treatments, and
the consequences of suicide. ' 272 A request distorted by clinical depression or mental illness would be disallowed, but depression
would not prevent competency if the patient's judgment is not
distorted-i.e., if the patient can make a reasoned decision consistent with her long-term values. 273 While Ganzini and Chochinov
emphasize that a substantial portion of terminally ill patients are
clinically depressed, 274 I find crucial the distinction that the Model
268

See infra Part IV, Sections D(3) and D(4).
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Baron et al., supra note 230, at 11 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
See id.
See generally Ganzini et al., supra note 251. See also Harvey Max Chochinov et

al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1185, 1187 (1995)
(finding a correlation between suicidal thoughts and clinical depression among termi-
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Act makes. It takes a strong position by allowing for the fact that a
terminal illness is inherently depressing, and to deny a competent
and reasonable patient P.A.S. based on their sadness or depression
would be improper and contrary to physicians' imperative to best
275
serve their patients' interests.
The second of the four prongs, that the patient be "fully informed" (§ 3(a)(3)(B) and § 4), relates to the competency requirement in that it calls for the patient to understand the medical
options available and their consequences. This is similar to the
Netherlands' provision, and it goes a good deal beyond merely
"presenting the patient with all reasonable alternatives," as some
authors have suggested with the best of intentions. 276 Thus, physicians must discuss all medical treatments that might improve the
patient's condition or prognosis, including palliative care, and
their benefits and burdens (§ 4(a)). Furthermore, borrowing from
Dr. Quill's article in The New England Journal of Medicine, Care
for the Hopelessly Ill, I believe the Model Act should extend this
provision to place an affirmative duty on physicians to ensure that
the patient's decision to opt for P.A.S. does not arise out of inadequate provision of comfort care. 277 In addition, the Model Act requires that physicians must inform their patients of the opportunity
to consult with a social worker (§ 4(b)) as well as the patient's
family (§ 4(c)). In the end then, for a request to be "fully informed," the patient must understand all of these alternatives and
"make a reasoned decision to seek suicide. ' 278
Third, § 3(a)(3)(C) requires a "voluntary" request by the patient-one that is made independently, free from coercion or undue influence. The authors cite to the definition of undue influence
in the Second Restatement of Contracts, and add that "[t]he patient
may consider the suggestions and recommendations of others, innally ill patients).
275 See Baron et al., supra note 230, at 18. See also Angell, supra note 264, at 52.
276 See Spencer, supra note 222, at 549 (urging that all reasonable alternatives be presented, in order to rightly seek out justice for members of vulnerable groups. However,
the Model Act believes that we must go further than mere suggestions of options in order
to ensure the protection of patients.).
277 See Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria
For Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 1380 (1992).
278 Baron et al., supra note 230, at 19.
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cluding the responsible physician, but the patient's choice must be
his or her own decision. ' 279 While the authors warn that passive
acquiescence in the recommendations of others would not qualify,
here lies one area in which I would propose a significant strengthening of the Model Act. Given the evidence on patient suggestibility presented by Foley and Coleson, 280 and the dangers of managed care financial incentives, I believe sound P.A.S. policy can
only help ensure the voluntary nature of the decision by insisting
that the patient initiate the first discussion of the subject. Physicians should be flatly prohibited from initially suggesting or recommending P.A.S. if we hope to curb the insidious effect of managed care and the erosion of medical ethics.
Lastly, § 3(a)(3)(D) requires that the patient's desire for P.A.S.
be "enduring." Going marginally beyond Oregon's procedures, the
Model Act demands that at a minimum, the request "must be
stated to the responsible physician on at least two occasions that
are at least two weeks apart, without self-contradiction during that
interval. ' 281 This makes good common sense, because any evidence of a wavering mind is enough to warrant the disallowance
of P.A.S. It is worthwhile to note that Dr. Kevorkian as well states
that he would immediately cease to aid a patient who changes her
mind, and never return, out of extreme caution for an indecisive
mind. 282 In response to Ganzini's evidence that many Oregon physicians believe a two week waiting period would be inadequate to
prevent suicides arising from a transitory desire for death, 283 I
again suggest that policy-makers consider increasing the duration
of the period slightly.
4. Procedural Safeguards
In addition to the four basic requirements detailed above, further procedural safeguards are imposed to ensure fulfillment of the
Model Act's purposes of preventing abuses of P.A.S. Section 3(a)
279
280

Id.
See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs: Verbatim
Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 Issues L. & Med. 13 (1997); Kathleen M.
Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician Assisted Suicide, 336 New
En . J. Med. 54 (1997).
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Baron et al., supra note 230, at 19 (emphasis added).
See Dr. Kevorkian's Attorney Defends Right to Die, supra note 265.
See Ganzini et al.,
supra note 251, at 1471-72.
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places the responsibility on the treating physician to ensure that all
of the Act's requirements are met. To achieve immunity from litigation over a patient's suicide, the doctor must not only have an
"honest belief' that the four elements of § 3 are met, but he must
also satisfy the procedural requirements of §§ 4, 5, and 6 discussed
below.2 84 These sections are aimed at producing independent corroboration that the physician's belief is not merely honest or reasonable, but accurate. Section 4(d) enforces the competency and
informational requirements by calling for two uninterested adults
to witness, and question as they see fit, the discussion of diagnosis,
prognosis, and medical treatment options with the patient. 285 The
responsible physician must also tape or summarize this conversation in writing, and have the patient and witnesses sign and attest
to its accuracy.2 86 As mentioned above, § 4(b) also puts the onus
on physicians to make a social worker available "to discuss nonmedical options that might change the patient's decision to seek
suicide. '287 Section 4(c) further requires that the doctor must suggest to the patient that she consult with family members regarding
her decision, but out of respect for her autonomy, the patient need
88
not do so. 2
Section 5 contains additional corroboration requirements. Section 5(a) obliges the doctor to obtain from a second physician corroboration in writing of the patients diagnosis and prognosis. Section 5(b) serves as a final patient safeguard, demanding a written
medical-factual opinion that the patient's decision is competent,
fully informed as to alternatives, and voluntary. With respect to
administrative and bureaucratic measures, § 6 of the Model Act
requires physician documentation of the provision of medical
means of suicide, and § 8(a) and § 9(d) authorize the state Department of Public Health to collect data and report on the effectiveness of legalized, regulated P.A.S. (which ideally allows for
modifying improvements in future years).
284 Baron et al., supra note 230, at 17-21. One should note though that no physician is
"relieved of any liability that they may otherwise incur as a result of any malpractice that
they commit in the process of assisting in a suicide." Id. at 20.
28
5 See id. at 28.
286
287

See id. at 28-29.
Id. at 20.
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5. Assessment of the Model Act and Summary of Suggestions
for Modifications
The Model Act is by its own admission not a utopian solution,
and acknowledges that its safeguards "come at a significant cost to
the patient and to the physician-patient relationship. 2 89 To ensure
that the patient's decision meets the Model Act's stringent requirements necessarily entails a severe intrusion into the patient's
right to privacy, as physicians ascertain and confirm her competent, informed, understanding, and voluntary choice. Additionally,
there are some inevitable line-drawing decisions that impose costs
despite the necessary safety they afford. For instance, while considerations of potential abuses require allowing only voluntary
P.A.S. (versus active euthanasia), I am troubled by the terminally
ill, competent patient who has lost the strength (or is paralyzed) to
administer life-ending drugs herself. If she is competent and fully
informed under the Model Act, why shouldn't she be able to voluntarily instruct that the life-ending treatment be administered to
her? Finally, the Model Act is likely to be the target of criticism
for expanding its coverage beyond the terminally ill to those who
are experiencing "unbearable suffering," but I feel it takes affirmative precautions to prevent this enlargement of scope from
becoming its downfall.
With respect to improvements upon the Model Act, as discussed above, I believe that sound P.A.S. policy should do more to
combat the problem of patient suggestibility (by preventing doctors from making the initial suggestion of P.A.S.). P.A.S. regulation would also do well to take up Dr. Quill on his recommendation that physicians have a duty to make certain that the patient's
decision to opt for death does not arise from inadequate palliative
care. Additionally, policy-makers should consider extending the
two-week waiting period by another seven days to counter the
problem of transitory desires for suicide presented by Ganzini.
Furthermore, similar to Oregon's initiative, the Model Act
does not require a doctor to be present when the fatal dose is taken
by the patient. In contrast, physicians in the Netherlands and Australia's Northern Territory are expected to be present at the time
289

Id. at 13.
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the patient ingests the lethal medication, and are permitted to administer a lethal injection if the oral dose does not result in
death. 290 Without deciding whether the second half of this foreign
provision is warranted in the United States, at the very least a physician's presence should be mandatory to ensure that the medication is taken properly and that it is not given to someone else. 29 1
The proposition that the patient should not be left alone to commit
suicide is also endorsed by Dr. Quill. He further sensibly emphasizes the need for a meaningful doctor-patient relationship, without which medication to assist in a suicide should not be pre292
scribed.
E. Would FederalLegislationBe Best?
Still, these quarrels with the Model Act are relatively small
compared to the enormous social good it offers. Sensible P.A.S.
regulation makes possible the relief of unbearable and demeaning
suffering, while mitigating the potential for abuse by renegade
Kevorkians by imposing rigid safeguards. The larger concern then,
looking forward to the Model Act's implementation in the real
world, is that the authors do not propose a complete solution.
They, along with the vast majority of medical and ethical scholars,
fail to address the issue of what will happen now that the P.A.S.
debate is left for states to resolve individually. This problem is essential to confront, as it is the precise situation America faces after
the Supreme Court's decision in Quill. Time will surely show that
massively contradictory results from state to state will be the outcome. 293 While there is something to be said for Justice Brandeis'
desire to see states as the laboratories of experimentation, 29 4 Susan
Wolf, Professor of Law and Medicine at the University of Minnesota, warns that many elderly and terminally ill will be forced to
move to another part of the country-and likely away from what290
291

See Lee et al., supra note 250, at 313.
Lee's study of Oregon physicians indicated that 51 percent were concerned about

the possible harm if an attempt failed, and 33 percent worried that someone other than
the patient might use the lethal prescription. Id.
292 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
293 See David Lawder, Assisted Suicide Debate May Rage in States, Reuters, June 27,
1997.

294 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (analogizing states to laboratories in need of the freedom to experiment).
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ever family support network they have-simply to end their life in
295
they manner they choose.
Uniform federal regulation of P.A.S., especially in the managed care context, should thus be our ultimate goal in enabling society's values, preferences, and fears to be balanced and resolved
in the most sensible and just manner possible. While Congress is
currently considering legislation that would prohibit appropriating
federal funds for P.A.S. and which would revoke the license of
physicians who prescribe the necessary drugs, 296 I believe this approach is too extreme. Crafting a uniform federal policy regulating
P.A.S. will undoubtedly prove to be a political minefield, but it is
the most responsible and viable option in addressing and resolving
the P.A.S. debate. I believe the Model Act, along with the minor
improvements that I and others have suggested, would serve Congress quite well as a guiding tool to face the nation's P.A.S. policy
goals.
CONCLUSION

I have struggled internally with the P.A.S. debate for many
years. In the interest of objectivity, I should disclose that I have
witnessed the long and painful decline and deaths of three of my
very close relatives. The insufferable agony and daily trauma of
such an experience is enough to convince most anyone of the merciful role of P.A.S., and I was once an outspoken supporter of an
absolute, unqualified "right to death." Now, however, with the rise
of managed care, and given the questions as to the existence of
true patient autonomy, I am far more wary of an unequivocal embrace of P.A.S. As Jefferson Smith has opined, our nation is now
"forced to decide which risk is worse-state action coercing
someone to live who should not live, or subtle action coercing
someone to die who should not die. '297 With this in mind, I certainly do not urge that all constitutional questions surrounding
P.A.S. be resolved forever in its favor. Still though, while the deci295 See Lawder, supra note 293.
296 See Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, HR 2260 (1999). The Act does not explicitly repeal state P.A.S. laws, but the ban on prescribing the medications needed to effectuate P.A.S. would serve to effectively criminalize the practice.
297 See Jefferson Smith, Physician Assisted Suicide, at 18 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law).
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sion to terminate life is perhaps the most difficult one any human
being could face, I remain convinced that on balance P.A.S. has a
place in a merciful and compassionate society. The crucial point to
take away from the valuable anti-P.A.S. research is not that the
practice should banned outright, but that it must be carefully scrutinized and regulated if its beneficial purpose is to be realized.
No personal decision has greater consequences than the one to
take one's own life, and thus the common-sense goal of America's
P.A.S. policy must be to ensure active, informed, voluntary, and
competent decision-making by the patient. The moral ramifications of P.A.S. in any setting disturb many Americans, but the
added financial incentive dimension of managed care delivery
systems would make the idea and practice of unregulated P.A.S.
unconscionable. I believe that only with tight controls and uniform
governmental oversight can the practice survive the legal and ethical assaults it inevitably faces in the years to come. The temptation
for abuse is simply unacceptable in America's current scattered
state of healthcare regulation, and the pressure for costcontainment is only growing worse. It thus behooves our society
to listen closely to the warnings of opponents of P.A.S. regardless
of any individual's political, religious, or moral views on the subject. Only by a reasoned, systematic analysis of the benefits and
pitfalls, such as that given by the team of physicians and academics who formulated the Model Act, can the potential abuses of legalized P.A.S. be curbed. With some minor modifications of the
Model Act, I urge that uniform federal implementation and regulation play an essential part in securing long-term public support
for P.A.S. Our policy must maximize the goals the practice was
intended to achieve while doing as much as possible to alleviate its
morally disturbing potential for abuse.
The key then is not unattainable perfection, but rather workable regulation and realism, allowing thousands of suffering human beings the opportunity to choose if and when to terminate
their lives. This monumental decision, inevitably in time of deep
personal crisis, should not be forced upon or encouraged of anyone, nor should it be stripped from the realm of autonomous, com-
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petent, fully-informed adults. Only with serious legislation and
regulation of P.A.S. in America can we achieve this most worthwhile balance.

